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Unmanned aerial vehicles—widely referred to as “drones”—are a key instrument 
of American foreign policy.  Yet, despite their importance, limited scholarship has 
been devoted to assessing the effectiveness of drone strikes as a means of 
advancing US objectives in the fight against Islamic extremism.   
 
This thesis examines the strategic value of the U.S. targeted killing program and 
finds that drones strikes, while tactically effective, have been employed in a 
manner which has undermined the pursuit of American strategic aims in this 
conflict.  Specifically, I conclude that although drones can serve as a highly-
effective tool for degrading the capabilities of extremist groups, the lack of 
precision and discretion which has characterized U.S. drone operations has 
served to alienate populations whose hearts and minds the United States has 
sought to win.   
 
Next, in light of the program’s shortcomings, I assess two prominent proposals 
that could help to meaningfully address these deficiencies.  The 9-11 
Commission called for the creation of a single Joint Committee on Intelligence in 
the mold of the now-defunct Joint Committee on Atomic Energy—a reform which 
has been widely-touted as a means of enhancing congressional oversight of 
clandestine operations, including drone strikes.  However, after reviewing the 
historical record, I conclude that this model would not improve—and could 




Another widely-discussed reform is President Obama’s 2013 proposal to transfer 
full control of drone operations to the Department of Defense.  I argue that this 
consolidation would likely improve the transparency of drone operations but that 
additional benefits will only be realized if this change serves as a catalyst for—
and is implemented in concert with—other badly-needed reforms.    
 
Finally, in the conclusion, I outline the policy implications of these findings and 
recommend, among other steps, that Congress and the Administration act to 
further restrict the use of drone strikes and to provide greater transparency 
regarding the policies that govern US targeting decisions.           
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Unmanned aerial vehicles—widely referred to as “drones,” even in the academic 
literature—are, as the name suggests, aircraft remotely piloted by operators who 
are sometimes located thousands of miles away.  Beginning in the Bush 
Administration and to an increasing degree under President Obama, they have 
come to represent a key instrument of American power overseas.   
 
Since the 9-11 attacks, American drones have flown an untold number of 
missions over territory from West Africa to Central Asia and beyond.  With the 
ability to linger for hours over a target, they are used not just for surveillance but 
also as a platform for firing precision-guided missiles.  The first US strike was 
reportedly in Yemen in 2002 and intense drone operations have subsequently 
been conducted over the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan as well as in 
Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia.1  The aircraft themselves are launched both from 
the US as well as from bases around the world—some known to the public and 
others secret.        
 
In part because of its novelty, drone warfare has received copious media and 
academic attention in recent years.  And yet, its importance to American foreign 
policy may still be under-appreciated.  Drones operated by American pilots have 
killed hundreds of insurgents and extremists and generated an equal (if not 
greater) number of civilian casualties and deaths.  Moreover, if and when US 
combat troops finally depart Afghanistan and the American-led bombing 
campaign against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) winds down, 
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drone strikes may represent the principal—if not the only—kinetic component of 
the war on terror.  
  
However, despite the centrality of drone strikes to American efforts in this era-
defining conflict, relatively little critical analysis has been devoted to their 
effectiveness as a means of advancing US strategic objectives.  Instead, much of 
the debate has centered on other interesting but arguably less consequential 
questions—from the accuracy of American drones to the legality of targeted 
strikes away from the traditionally-defined battlefield to the ethics of killing at 
such a far remove from one’s enemies.   
 
These concerns have arguably served to shift the focus of the public discourse 
away from the true test of America’s target killing program – simply, put, is it 
positively contributing to the achievement of America’s broader aims in what is 
shaping up to be an enduring struggle against Islamic extremism?  And if not, 
how should these efforts, which stand at the very center of the US response to 
this global threat, be reformed or recalibrated to ensure that they are, in fact, 
serving America’s interests? 
 
This, in a nutshell, is the subject of the three chapters that follow.  First, I 
examine the value of the US targeted killing program and find that drones strikes, 
while tactically effective, have been employed in a manner which has rendered 
them strategically ineffective.  Next, in light of the program’s shortcomings, I 
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assess two prominent proposals that could help to meaningfully address these 
deficiencies.   
     
Specifically, in the first chapter, I find that while drones are a highly-effective tool 
for degrading the capabilities of extremist groups, this instrument of American 
power has been used bluntly where surgical precision would have been 
preferable.  In general, the Obama administration, the CIA and the Department of 
Defense have broadly failed to practice sufficient transparency or discretion in 
authorizing drone strikes.  And this excessive but also highly-secretive use-of-
force has served to push the affected populations in countries from Central Asia 
to the Horn of Africa into the arms of very men the attacks were meant to 
destroy.  
  
Over the next two chapters, recognizing the flaws and limitations of America’s 
existing drone strategies, I examine the barriers that have prevented a more 
effective approach from being implemented and assess key reforms that have 
been proposed to address the drone program’s shortcomings.  For example, 
despite mounting civilian casualties and clear evidence that the use of American 
drones deserves to be urgently reexamined, when it comes to this critical aspect 
of American foreign policy, Congress has largely surrendered its constitutional 
role as check on the Executive.  Unfortunately, this is consistent with the 





In Chapter II, I evaluate one of the most prominent remedies for this dereliction of 
duty by a Congress which has proven itself overly willing to defer to the 
Administration on the conduct of American drone strikes.  The 9-11 Commission, 
tasked with developing recommendations to address the security and intelligence 
failings that abetted the 2001 attacks, called for the creation of a single Joint 
Committee on Intelligence.  Explicitly modeled after the famous Joint Committee 
on Atomic Energy (JCAE), this panel would replace the current House and 
Senate Select Committees on Intelligence and would, in theory, be empowered 
to hold the intelligence community’s collective feet to the fire.   
 
To assess the wisdom of this course of action, I evaluate the record of the JCAE 
in Chapter II and find that the committee was indeed exceptionally powerful and 
that all components of the American nuclear enterprise—from the Department of 
Energy to the US military—were extremely solicitous of the panel’s whims.  
However, rather than serving as an effective check on successive Presidents’ 
plans for the construction of nuclear power plants and the expansion of the US 
nuclear arsenal, the members of the JCAE arguably served as the loudest and 
most successful cheerleaders for these endeavors.   
 
Indeed, the committee became, in the opinion of observers at the time, almost a 
co-decision maker on nuclear matters alongside the Administration.  And 
because of its unique, bicameral structure and exclusive access the information, 
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the JCAE was able, for much of its history, to effectively block those in Congress 
who raised questions about the safety and economic-sense of expanding 
American nuclear power.   
 
In light of this disturbing record and the fact that the two intelligence committees 
in Congress are arguably overly sympathetic to the views of the agencies they 
are charged with overseeing, I argue that the JCAE represents the wrong model 
for improving oversight of clandestine operations, including drone warfare.  
Instead of consolidating congressional power, I suggest that Congress and the 
Administration should consider broadening and diversifying the members and 
committees with a say in America’s drone warfare policies.  The possibility of an 
increase in the number of unauthorized leaks is, in my view, outweighed by the 
potential for more independent, clear-eyed oversight of American drone strikes. 
 
Another key reform aimed at reducing the fundamental lack clarity and 
transparency which has come to characterize American drone warfare is a 
widely-discussed proposal to transfer full control of drone operations to the 
Department of Defense.  At present, the CIA and the Department of Defense 
both operate parallel drone programs and maintain separate but overlapping “kill 
lists” of terror suspects marked for elimination.     
 
Endorsed by prominent critics of the targeted killing program from Micah Zenko 
of the Council on Foreign Relations to House Select Committee on Intelligence 
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Ranking Member Adam Schiff (D-CA) to President Obama himself, this shift 
holds out the promise of drone operations conducted overtly and in accordance 
with policies known to the public.   
 
DOD drone operations follow clear procedures, including vetting across military 
services—the same procedures that apply to strikes launched from conventional 
platforms.  And following each attack, a review is conducted to determine 
“whether the target was carried out in line with rules of engagement and how the 
strike’s success or failure fits into the larger operational strategy.”2  In contrast, 
according to reports, the CIA targeting process is far-more efficient and includes 
fewer internal checks and balances.  The intelligence agency also closely guards 
the content of its drone policies, limiting transparency and impeding effective 
oversight.         
 
 
In part for these reasons, in Chapter III, I argue that shifting drone operations 
away from the CIA could have significant benefits.  The deniability of CIA drone 
strikes has long been cited as their principal virtue, conveniently allowing foreign 
governments to look the other way when American attacks are launched on their 
sovereign territory.  However, I argue that, at this stage, the “deniability” that 
constitutes the core rationale for involving the CIA in drone operations is a 
transparent fiction – it is abundantly clear who is responsible when, say, a 
convoy in northern Pakistan is suddenly struck by missiles from above.    We 
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should recognize—as our opponents clearly do—that strategic communications 
are critical in the struggle against Islamic extremism.  And America’s refusal to 
disclose anything about these strikes, including why they were launched and who 
was killed, has severely undermined American efforts to win hearts and minds 
across the Islamic world.  
 
However, echoing the views of legal scholar Marty Lederman, I contend that the 
benefits of this transition will hardly be automatic.  Contrary to the claims of some 
critics, there is nothing in statute that would prevent the US military from 
conducting its own drone operations in exactly the same, secretive manner as 
the CIA.  That’s why I argue that the full benefits of shifting drone operations to 
DOD control will only be realized if this sweeping change serves as a catalyst 
for—and is implemented in concert with—other badly-needed improvements. 
 
To be clear, consolidating drone operations at DOD is not a definitive solution to 
the serious problems which have served to undermine the strategic effectiveness 
of American drone strikes.  Based on the available evidence, however, this 
simple reform would almost certainly mark an improvement over the status quo.  
Transitioning to a single military drone program would streamline and simplify 
oversight.  It would also move drone operations away from an organization 
institutionally committed to secrecy to one traditionally bound by the laws of war.  
In addition, this shift would have the added benefit of ending the unfortunate 
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precedent set in the post 9-11 era of the CIA essentially acting as a kind of secret 
Air Force, regularly conducting covert, quasi-military operations.    
 
Finally, in the conclusion, I outline what those reforms might look like and why 
they are so critical to America’s broader efforts in the war on terror.  At the most 
basic level—mirroring the recommendations of Zenko and others—I make the 
case that US drone strikes must be conducted with greater precision, discretion 
and transparency.  That means only targeting high-value individuals who are 
known to US intelligence; not low-level fighters or, worse still, civilians who 
happen to live near the bad guys.  It also means instituting policies to ensure that 
drone strikes are employed in manner that severely limits this kind of 
unnecessary collateral damage.  And, finally, it means disclosing those policies 
to the public and providing a full accounting to Congress and the American 
people of when and how drones are used.   
 
Of course, these vital changes are unlikely to be made—and even less likely to 
be sustained—if the legislative branch continues to abrogate its constitutional 
responsibility to oversee drone operations.  Congressional action will be critical if 
the targeted killing program is to maximize its strategic value to the United 
States.   
 
Ultimately, I tie the failures of American drone warfare to a misapprehension 
about the nature of the conflict in which the United States has found itself 
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inextricably entangled.  The war on terror is a contest of ideas as much as 
physical confrontation.  It matters very little that American drones are 
successfully killing scores of extremists if these strikes are abetting the 
recruitment of scores more.  It’s time for American strategists to better align the 
instruments of American power, including drones, with the social and political 













































Chapter I: Assessing the Effectiveness of the Obama Administration’s 






















In 2013, 11 vehicles carrying the members of a large wedding party in southern 
Yemen, near the remote town of Radda, were struck by hellfire missiles 
launched from American drones hovering thousands of feet overhead.  All told, 
17 people perished in the attack and at least 22 suffered serious injuries.  5 
Islamic extremists, possible members of the militant group Al Qaeda in the 
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), were among those killed.  The rest were apparently 
innocents, people from a remote corner of Yemen who died because of 
decisions made on the other side of the world.3  The incident understandably 
sparked considerable controversy and led to renewed calls for reforming 
President Obama’s drone policies.     
  
Attacks like this one and the various responses they inspire pose important 
questions for American policymakers.  Do these strikes, in the words of a 
Congressional Research Service analysis, “alienate the local population, 
strengthen nationalist and anti-American forces, and cause too much collateral 
damage—thereby exacerbating the terrorism threat over the long term?"4  Or 
are they a critical instrument of American foreign policy—one that ultimately 
saves lives, both at home and abroad?  These dueling positions stand at the 
center of the debate on the Obama administration’s targeted killing program 
and how that debate unfolds will have significant implications for America’s 
approach to combating violent Islamic extremism in the coming decade.    
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The 9-11 tragedy precipitated a dramatic transformation of American defense 
policy.  The United States launched two protracted wars and spent untold 
billions bolstering the security of the American homeland and augmenting the 
nation’s intelligence-gathering capabilities.  Just as importantly, Al Qaeda also 
compelled the U.S. government to implement new tactics and technologies to 
confront the novel threat posed by organized, stateless terrorism.       
  
Among the most controversial of these developments was the adoption of the 
targeted killing of terror suspects—encompassing both drone strikes and 
Special Forces operations—as the centerpiece of the fight against Islamic 
extremism.  Though the program was conceived by the Bush administration, 
this approach was enthusiastically embraced by President Obama, who 
dramatically expanded the scale and geographic scope of strikes against 
terrorist targets.  During his first term, Obama approved fully six times as many 
drone strikes as his predecessor had over his entire eight year tenure in 
office.5   
  
On March 2, 2011, President Obama authorized the most famous and 
consequential of these targeted killings when Navy Seals breached Osama bin 
Laden’s compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, and executed the al Qaeda leader 
before escaping back to Afghanistan.  But despite the momentous success of 
                                                          
5 Michael J. Boyle, “The Costs and Consequences of Drone Warfare,” International Affairs, 
January 2013, Vol. 89, pg 2  
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this operation, the Obama administration’s program, and especially its reliance 
on drone warfare, continues to provoke contentious debate, both domestically 
and internationally.   
  
The Administration and its supporters contend that surgical strikes against al 
Qaeda and other extremist groups have severely undermined their capabilities, 
preventing them from successfully attacking American interests.  Critics, 
however, continue to question the transparency of the target approval process 
and the legality of the program under U.S. and international law.6   The Obama 
administration has also faced intense criticism over the number of innocents 
and low-level operatives killed in operations aimed at eliminating individual 
terror suspects.7 The program’s fiercest detractors accuse President Obama of 
resorting to drone strikes in order to avoid the legal quagmire that surrounds 
what to do with terror suspects once they have been apprehended and placed 
in U.S custody.8  
  
While the ethical questions associated with the targeted killing of terror 
suspects are undeniably important, especially for a nation that still aspires to be 
a “City on the Hill,” these concerns are beyond the scope of my 
                                                          
6 Leila Sadat, “America’s Drone Wars,” Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, Fall 
2012, Vol. 45, Issue 1-2, pg 224-228 
7 Amitai Etzioni, “The Great Drone Debate,” Military Review, March/April 2013, Vol. 93, Issue 2, 
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research.  Instead, this paper will focus on more immediate and practical 
concerns; specifically whether the program does, in fact, enhance America’s 
national security or whether its various attendant negative consequences 
outweigh the benefits of eliminating individuals who pose a threat to the United 
States.  Drone strikes have killed hundreds of innocents and stirred up intense 
levels of resentment towards the United States in Afghanistan, Pakistan, 
Somalia and Yemen.  However, the available evidence also suggests that the 
targeted killing of terror suspects can be an effective means of degrading the 
capabilities and undermining the morale of extremist groups.  In light of these 
findings, the Administration would be wise to consider new reforms to its 
targeted killing program to maximize its effectiveness and minimize its potential 
to radicalize local populations impacted by American drone attacks.   
 
This chapter seeks to provide an even-handed assessment of the effectiveness 
of the Obama Administration’s targeted killing program.  First, I review the 
prevailing arguments both for and against US strikes against suspected 
terrorists.  Next, I examine two cases—one in Afghanistan and the other in 
Israel—that show how the elimination of terrorist leaders can serve to degrade 
the capabilities of extremist groups, resulting in a reduction in the sophistication 
and lethality of the attacks they launch. However, despite their promise, I review 
statistics and first-hand reporting from Pakistan that, taken together, indicates 
that the manner in which US strikes have been conducted has fostered 
significant enmity towards the United States among the affected population.  
16 
 
Finally, recognizing these costs and benefits, I offer recommendations for 
reforming the policies governing the targeted killing program that could reduce 




Support for the Targeted Killing Program 
For its supporters, the basic case for the Obama administration’s targeted 
killing program is simple: it saves American lives.  In defending the program, 
the President himself has pointed to terror conspiracies he claims were 
thwarted by these strikes.   “To begin with, our actions are effective…” he said 
in a May 2013 speech, “Plots have been disrupted that would have targeted 
international aviation, U.S. transit systems, European cities and our troops in 
Afghanistan.”9  Of course, like similar assertions about internet surveillance 
activities and other controversial aspects of the War on Terror, the basis for 
these claims is difficult to verify.     
  
At a time when Americans are loathe to consent to putting “boots on the 
ground” virtually anywhere, targeted killings and specifically drone warfare are 
appealing both practically and politically.  For policy-makers, drone streaks 
represent a low-risk option with limited potential for American casualties.  They 
                                                          






are also accurate and effective, say supporters.  Drones can linger over a 
potential target for long periods—a Predator drone can remain aloft for as long 
as 20 hours—before seizing the perfect moment to fire a precision guided 
Hellfire missile at the enemy.10   
  
Supporters of the program also argue that decapitating terrorist organizations is 
an effective tactic.  Just as in more mundane lines of work, extremist groups 
have discovered that good leaders are hard to come by and cannot be readily 
replaced.11  When top commanders are eliminated, the men who attempt to fill 
their shoes are likely to be less experienced and more prone to making critical 
mistakes than their predecessors.12   
  
The constant fear of drone strikes also makes it far more difficult for terrorist 
organizations to effectively plan and prepare for future operations.  Afraid of 
drawing attention to themselves, militant leaders may eschew electronic 
communications and avoid gathering their forces in large numbers.13  This 
creates significant coordination challenges and limits the complexity of the 
operations they can successfully mount.  In addition, the “unpredictability and 
terrifying anticipation of sudden attack” can have a meaningful psychological 
                                                          
10 Mark Bowden, “The Killing: How to think about drones,” The Atlantic, September 2013 
11 Kenneth Anderson, “The Case for Drones," Commentary, June 2013, Vol. 135, Issue 6 , pg 8 
12 Daniel Byman, “Why Drones Work,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2013, Vol. 92. Issue 4, pg 2 
13 Byman, pg 2 
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impact on terrorist leaders.14  At some point they may become too consumed 
with simply surviving to plot new attacks against American targets.       
  
Even where they acknowledge the drawbacks of targeted killings, supporters 
argue that this approach is superior to the available alternatives.  They believe 
drone strikes offer a more accurate and humane option than attacking with 
fighter aircraft, deploying conventional ground forces or requesting that local 
forces take up the fight.  As President Obama stated in May:  
 
“Conventional airpower or missiles are far less precise than drones, and 
are likely to cause more civilian casualties and more local outrage.  
 
And invasions of these territories lead us to be viewed as occupying 
armies, unleash a torrent of unintended consequences, are difficult to 
contain, result in large numbers of civilian casualties, and ultimately 
empower those who thrive on violent conflict.”15 
 
Outsourcing the elimination of terrorists to foreign governments is also a poor 
alternative, according to supporters.  “…using drones,” argues Daniel Byman, 
“is far less bloody then asking allies to hunt down terrorist on the United States’ 
behalf.”16  The Pakistani military’s bloody incursions into its Federally 
                                                          
14 Anderson, pg 7 
15 New York Times, “Transcript: Obama’s Speech on Drones,” 
16 Byman, pg 3 
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Administrated Tribal Areas to suppress extremist groups offer a case in point.  
As Kenneth Anderson notes, “…villagers are aware that the American drones 
are undertaking strikes that the Pakistani government might otherwise 
undertake.  Critics often neglect to focus on the Pakistani governments’ regular 
and brutal assaults in the tribal zones…voices in the Pakistani newspapers 
have often made note that the tribal areas fear the Pakistani army more than 
they fear U.S. drones.”            
  
Moreover, it’s telling, supporters say, that despite their public comments, 
foreign governments have privately consented to, and even encouraged, 
American drone strikes within their borders.  “In order to maintain popular 
support, politicians in Pakistan and Yemen routinely rail against the U.S. drone 
campaign,” writes Byman.  “In reality, the governments of both countries have 
supported it.”  Pakistan has repeatedly received early warnings regarding 
upcoming strikes and, at one time, allowed U.S. drone facilities to be based in 
its territory.  Similarly, to deflect public criticism, former Yemeni President Saleh 
claimed on multiple occasions that his country’s air force was responsible for 
strikes that had actually been perpetrated by American drones.     
 
Supporters also dismiss concerns about public opinion in Pakistan and other 
countries.  Kenneth Anderson notes that, in a recent study, though many 
Pakistanis expressed anger over American drone strikes, half of the population 
20 
 
was completely unaware of the program’s existence.17  A significant segment of 
the Pakistani population also supports the program because of the “significant 
toll that terrorists and armed non-state groups take on the civilian 
population.”18    
 
Finally, as Byman frankly acknowledges, “it has become more politically 
palatable for the United States to kill rather detain suspected terrorists.”19  
Unless the views of the American public change, supporters suggest targeted 
killings may continue to be unavoidable in the future. 
  
 
The Case Against Targeted Killings  
While the moral and legal arguments against targeted killings are complex and 
varied,20 the prevailing criticisms of their utility can be distilled much more 
succinctly.  According to the Administration’s detractors, by embracing strikes 
against terror suspects, President Obama has allowed short-term tactical 
considerations to outweigh America’s long-term strategic interests.  Put another 
way, drone strikes have succeeded in achieving momentary gains but only at 
the expense of the U.S. government’s broader objectives in the War on Terror.   
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18 Stanford International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic, “Living Under Drones,” 
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19 Byman, pg 3 
20 Leila Sadat, “America’s Drone Wars,” Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, Fall 
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Obama Administration's Targeted Killing Program: A Response to Jeh Johnson,” Yale Law & 
Policy Review, Fall 2012, Vol. 31, Issue 1; and Amitai Etzioni, “The Great Drone Debate,” Military 




“Drones are only effective,” argues Michael Boyle, “if they contribute to 
achieving U.S. strategic goals in a region, a fact which is often lost in analyses 
that point only to body counts as a measure of worthiness.”21  According to 
critics, by equating success in the War on Terror with the number of terrorist 
leaders eliminated, the Administration has lost sight of the strategic costs of the 
targeted killing program. 
  
One of the most important such costs, say critics, is that by embracing drone 
strikes, the Administration has effectively handed al Qaeda a powerful 
propaganda tool.  According to Audrey Cronin, video of these attacks and their 
sometimes harrowing consequences has served as an effective means of 
attracting new recruits to extremist causes.  The strikes, she says, play into an 
established al Qaeda narrative of “Americans as immoral bullies” who 
perpetrate “indiscriminate violence against Muslims.”22  
  
It’s worth noting that the would-be Times Square bomber, Faisal Shahzad, cited 
drone attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan that killed scores of innocents in 
explaining his intention to murder as many Americans as possible.  “They kill 
women, children, they kill everybody…They’re killing all Muslims,” Faisal 
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reportedly told a judge.23  His comments have been cited critics who argue that 
this crucial component of the War on Terror is actually serving to inspire more 
terror attacks.     
  
Another negative consequence of the program, according to critics, is that it 
continues to enflame anti-American sentiment in the Muslim world and that it 
serves to alienate and radicalize the populations of regions exposed to frequent 
drone strikes.  While causal relationships are difficult to draw and the data is 
widely disputed, critics contend that these attacks have driven popular opinion 
of the U.S. to new lows.  A Pew Research Center poll conducted in June 2012 
found that almost three-fourths of all Pakistanis now consider the United States 
to be an enemy – evidence, critics say, that the strikes are driving the Pakistani 
people into the arms of America’s foes.24  This hatred, argues Boyle, has 
compromised American efforts to upgrade the capacity of the Pakistani state 
and improve its resilience to domestic extremist elements.   
  
In the regions of Pakistan most heavily impacted by drone warfare, these 
effects are felt much more acutely.  While the Administration’s rhetoric 
regarding the program has focused almost exclusively on high-value terrorist 
targets, critics allege that the vast majority of attacks have been directed at 
middle and low-ranking operatives.  Their deaths have, in turn, enraged the 
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tribes, clans and families to which they belonged, inspiring angry relatives to 
enlist in extremist groups and causes.   
  
This sense of injustice is significantly magnified when those who perished were 
not terrorists or militants but mere bystanders, people caught in the wrong place 
at the wrong time.  “…consider the emotions of those on the receiving end left 
to pick up the body parts of their husbands, fathers, brothers, friends,” writes 
Mark Bowden.  “…imagine the sense of impotence and rage.”25  Yet, according 
to drone warfare skeptic Carla Robbins, the powerful emotions unleashed by 
these strikes aren’t lost on the Administration.  She cites retired General 
Stanley McChrystal who observed that in Pakistan, the strikes “are hated at a 
visceral level, even by people who’ve never seen one.”26   
  
More than the mere fact that friends and relatives are dying at the hands of a 
foreign power, it is the nature of drone warfare itself that is driving Pakistanis 
into the arms of extremists, according to critics.  Specifically, because American 
technology in the form of drones appears so arrogant and so omnipotent, 
argues Bowden, it lends legitimacy to terrorism as “…the only viable option for 
the weak to fight against a powerful empire.”27   
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Responding to this widespread antipathy, politicians in Pakistan and elsewhere 
across the Muslim world have increasingly staked out anti-American 
positions.  Yet, despite their public pronouncements, they appear powerless to 
stop the American strikes.  For Boyle, this is the central contradiction at the 
heart of the targeted killing program.  The United States is simultaneously 
investing billions to bolster the capabilities of the Pakistani and Yemeni 
governments while at the same time undermining their legitimacy in the eyes of 
their people by making them appear “helpless and subservient” to their 
American benefactors.28   
  
Towards an Effective, Transparent and Limited Targeted Killing Program 
Analysts and academics on both sides of this debate are prone to 
overstatement, exaggeration and absolutism.  Too often, drone warfare is either 
hailed for its devastating effectiveness or decried as an affront to America’s 
values and America’s national interest.  In reality, the relevant facts remain 
somewhat ambiguous, almost all of the statistics on casualties and deaths are 
unreliable and it will probably be many years before a full accounting of the 
program is possible.   
  
As a result, any conclusions about the program effectiveness must be drawn 
circumspectly.  That said, however, it appears that the targeted killing of terror 
suspects has been responsible for some modest, tactical gains in recent years 
against the Taliban and, especially, al Shabaab in East Africa.  Yet serious 
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concerns remain regarding the extent to which drone strikes are effectively 
furthering America’s strategic objectives.   
  
Beyond the targeted killing of individuals who wish to harm the United States, a 
number of other factors have contributed to the American government’s recent 
success in Afghanistan.  For example, the nation’s intelligence capabilities are 
significantly stronger than they were a decade ago and Al Qaeda and its 
affiliates can count on the support of fewer friendly governments.  While 
progress in these areas complicates efforts to isolate the effectiveness of the 
targeted killing program, case studies provide a means of teasing out how well 
the program is serving America’s strategic interests. 
  
The deaths of four Taliban leaders in Afghanistan between 2007 and 2008 offer 
a window into how targeted strikes have reshaped the behavior of militants in 
the region.  Alex Wilner examined the deaths of Mullah Dadullah, Mullah 
Mahmud Baluch, Qari Faiz Mohammad, and Mullah Abdul Matin—high ranking 
Taliban commanders who were killed in four separate American strikes over a 
one year period.29  He then used public source data to analyze the impact of 
the loss of these men on the Taliban’s ability to wage war against American and 
Afghan forces in Southern Afghanistan.   
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Wilner is a supporter of the targeted killing program and was initially surprised 
to discover that the total number of attacks launched by the Taliban actually 
increased slightly in the period following the deaths of the four 
commanders.  However, as he rightly points out, assessing only the number of 
militant attacks, as some critics have done, misses the real impact of the 
targeted killing program.   
 
Wilner determined that following the commanders’ deaths, while more attacks 
occurred, the complexity and lethality of Taliban bombings in the area 
significantly decreased.  “As leaders and facilitators were eliminated,” writes 
Wilner, “the Taliban began using less sophisticated forms of violence that 
required less energy, expertise and time to organize effectively.”30   
 
In essence, without these leaders, the Taliban collectively became less 
competent and less professional.  Their improvised explosive devices (IEDs) 
now failed to detonate more than a third of the time, becoming 15 percent less 
reliable overall.  Similarly, the number of suicide bombings—the Taliban’s most 
effective tactic against coalition forces—fell by over 30 percent as the Taliban 
increasingly turned to other types of attacks that were easier to organize and 
execute.31  
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The deaths of the four commanders also spurred the Taliban leadership to 
make key policy changes, which may have contributed to the declining 
effectiveness of the group’s efforts.  Subsequently, members of the Taliban 
central command were barred from operating in Southern Afghanistan because 
of the “high risk of death.”  In addition, “control over military strategy [was] 
decentralized and passed down to lower-level district commanders.”32   
 
These changes in organizational structure and the Taliban’s decreasing 
professionalism and operational success offer meaningful evidence of the 
effectiveness of the targeted killing program.  US strikes successfully modified 
the group’s behavior and degraded its capabilities.  According to Wilner’s 
research, at least in the short term, the targeted killing program had clearly 
dealt a powerful blow to the Taliban in Southern Afghanistan.    
  
Israeli statistics reveal a similar pattern.  Israel’s targeted killing program, which 
ceased its operations in 2005 in response to international pressure, focused on 
high ranking leaders in Hamas and Hezbollah who were actively involved in 
terrorist plots aimed at Israeli citizens.  Just as in Afghanistan, Israeli strikes 
against individual terrorist leaders had a limited impact on the overall number of 
terror attacks in Israel.  However, mirroring Wilner’s findings, the lethality of 
these attacks declined significantly as a result of the Israeli program.  While the 
number of Hamas bombings varied widely from year to year, the number of 
Israeli lives lost to terrorism consistently decreased in the period from 2001 to 




2005.33  Just as in Afghanistan, Hamas’ activities became increasingly 
ineffective as the organization proved unable to replace trained operatives killed 
in Israeli strikes.        
  
These examples and others confirm the basic model of how and why the 
targeted elimination of terror suspects can work to advance US interests.  “The 
constant removal of leadership leaves an organization in general 
disarray.”34  Commanding and communicating with lower level personnel 
becomes more difficult.  The group’s freedom of movement becomes 
constrained.  The building of bombs is disrupted as skilled operatives are 
eliminated.  Ultimately, significant time and resources that might have gone 
towards plotting new attacks are instead consumed by the constant task of 
simply trying to stay alive.   
 
The end result, as seen in both the Afghan and Israeli case examples, is not 
necessarily a decrease in the overall level of terrorist activity but rather a 
decline in the potency of the targeted group’s attacks.  Targeted killings breeds 
a metastasizing dysfunction within the militant organization, severely limiting its 
ability to take meaningful action. 
  
Still, none of this is to say that the concerns raised by critics of the targeted 
killing program are illegitimate.  Indeed, there is ample evidence that missiles 
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launched indiscriminately from American drones have unjustly killed large 
numbers of civilians.  And this death and destruction, beyond its moral 
implications, may be hampering the pursuit of America’s strategic goals in the 
war on terror by driving affected individuals into the arms of the very groups the 
U.S. is seeking to combat.  
 
First, it is worth noting that public opinion data across the Muslim world show 
nearly unanimously opposition to the US drone program.  According to a 2013 
survey conducted by the Pew Research Center, drone strikes are supported by 
only 5 percent of Pakistanis.  Pew also recoded similarly negligible levels of 
popular approval in every Muslim country where polls were conducted, 
including Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, Indonesia, Tunisia, and the Palestinian 
territories  
 
More importantly, and with the caveat that these figures may be unreliable, 
prominent NGO’s have also managed to gather statistics related to individual 
drone strikes that, collectively, paint a disturbing picture.  According to 
estimates from the New America Foundation, the approximately 300 to 400 
American drone strikes conducted worldwide between 2008 and 2013 killed 
between 1,963 and 3,293 people, of whom 430 to 635 were innocent of any 
involvement with violent extremist groups.35  In Pakistan—reportedly the site of 
the most deadly American drone operations—the Bureau of Investigative 
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Journalism believes that since 2004, between 423 and 965 civilians (including 
as many as 207 children) have been killed in drone strikes while between 1,154 
and 1,734 people have suffered serious injuries in these attacks.36                 
 
Figures from official sources also reflect high levels of non-combatant 
casualties from drone strikes.  A 2013 United Nations report cites Pakistani 
government statistics indicating that at least 400—and probably far more—
civilians had been killed in drone strikes since 2004.37  (Pakistani officials noted 
that security concerns, the remoteness of the affected regions, and the local 
practice of immediately burying the dead made accurate reporting difficult.  
They told UN investigators that, as a result of these impediments, the numbers 
they provided “were likely to be an underestimate.”)38    
 
Repeated, futile efforts to kill a small number of insurgents can also produce 
high numbers of casualties.  The British NGO Reprieve, citing casualty figures 
that are significantly larger than the official statistics, claims that strikes aimed 
at just 24 suspected terrorists in Pakistan cumulatively produced 874 civilian 
deaths over a four year period.39  In many cases, the terrorists were reported 
killed in official documents only to reappear later, prompting yet more strikes 
and fresh rounds of casualties.  Across all countries where data was available, 
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the group found that repeated efforts to kill just 41 men could be linked to more 
than 1,000 other deaths40 -- heart-wrenching numbers that attest to the lack of 
precision and discretion that continues to characterize American drone warfare.     
 
A report released in May 2013 by Amnesty International furnishes disturbing 
details to match these troubling statistics.  It describes the death of an elderly 
grandmother in Waziristan who was killed by a drone while picking vegetables 
with her grandchildren.  Amnesty also documented a case in which 18 unarmed 
laborers, including at least one minor, died following a series of strikes on an 
isolated village in Northern Pakistan.41  
  
For communities in the crosshairs, the cumulative effect of drone strike after 
drone strike can be devastating.  People in areas prone to drone activity are 
constantly wary of being mistakenly targeted.  American attacks have “inhibited 
normal economic and social activity” and “turned neighbors on neighbors and 
fuelled communal distrust in a society where overlapping family, tribal and 
social ties are crucial.”42  Miram Shah, in Northwest Pakistan, site of perhaps 
more of these attacks than any other settlement in the world, has become a 
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“fearful and paranoid town” where sales of “sleeping tablets, antidepressants 
and medicines to treat anxiety have soared.”43  
 
The impact of American strikes over time was summed up by a Pakistani 
villager who explained to Stanford researchers that, “Before this we were all 
very happy.  We lived a very good life.  But after these drones attacks a lot of 
people are victims and have lost members of their family. A lot of them, they 
have mental illnesses.”44    
  
When critics allege that the targeted killing program is doing more harm than 
good, these are the social consequences they cite as inspiring “blowback” 
against Americans. (Anderson, 8)  And while the available evidence suggests 
the program has produced meaningful tactical gains, at the same time, there is 
a strong case to be made that the excessive and imprecise use of drones may 
also be making local populations more sympathetic to militant groups.  This 
speaks to the need to reform the targeted killing program to minimize the 
“blowback” effect.  As a recent high-level review of US drone policies conducted 
by the Stimson Center concluded,  
“Even where strikes kill only legitimate targets, the perceived insult to 
sovereignty — in places such as Pakistan and Yemen and among fellow tribe 
members of the dead — sparks bitterness, feelings of nationalism or other 
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It’s worth noting that this effect can also work in the opposite direction.  Drone 
strikes have successfully “promp[ted] local residents in Afghanistan to want Al 
Qaeda and other outsiders to leave their communities.”46  Indeed, in some 
cases, civilians may welcome the deaths of oppressive militant leaders.  As 
Anderson observes, it is highly questionable whether “villagers are sad to see 
the Taliban commander who just insisted on marrying someone’s young 
daughter blown up in an airstrike.”47      
 
Still, thousands of American strikes have yet to produce the promised results in 
Pakistan and Afghanistan, where the Taliban insurgency remains a vital force.  
Similarly, in Yemen, intensive drone operations failed to save the US-backed 
government or halt the rise of the Houthi rebels.  On the whole, despite 
dispatching unknown numbers of both suspected extremists and innocent 
civilians in recent years, it remains unclear to what extent the US is making any 
real progress towards broader objectives in the war on terror.  If anything, the 
opposite may be true.  This speaks to the fact that this conflict isn’t one that can 
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be won simply by killing enough of America’s adversaries and it argues in favor 
of a greater effort to reduce the “blow-back” effect.      
 
Thankfully, in May 2013, President Obama announced reforms that would 
reduce the scale of the targeted killing program and help to ensure that it would 
operate in a more constrained and narrowly focused manner.  And 
subsequently, administration officials say the total number of strikes has 
declined significantly.48   
 
However, two years later, all of the reforms have still not been fully 
implemented.  Moreover, the disturbing cases captured by Amnesty 
International occurred after many these policy changes had already come into 
effect.  Amnesty’s reporting also appeared to show that the way in which the 
people of Northwest Pakistan perceive American drone warfare practices was 
unaffected by these reforms.49   
  
Conclusion 
Several basic reforms would address these concerns, helping to minimize the 
negative consequences of targeted killings—impacts that critics believe make 
the program a strategic liability for the United States.  First, the Administration 
should follow through on its promise to end so-called “signature strikes,” attacks 
against individuals whom the CIA surmises to be associated with extremists 
                                                          




groups based simply on observable patterns of behavior and not on any 
specific intelligence.  “It is ironic,” writes Michael Boyle, “that Al Qaeda’s image 
of the United States—as an all-seeing, irreconcilably hostile enemy who rains 
down bombs and death on innocent Muslims—is inadvertently reinforced by a 
drones policy that does not bother to ask the names of its victims.”50  At a 
minimum, the United States should know whom it is targeting before unleashing 
hellfire missiles from the sky.   
  
More broadly, the United States should end strikes against low-level operatives 
and Taliban foot soldiers.  A truly surgical program focused exclusively on high-
value terrorist targets would create less collateral damage and inspire less 
resentment amongst local populations.  It would also better coincide with 
President Obama’s rhetoric on this issue, helping to bolster American 
credibility.       
  
America’s standing would also be enhanced if the Administration moved swiftly 
to address the transparency concerns which have marred the program since its 
inception.  Both domestically and internationally, the targeted killing of terror 
suspects is widely perceived as an arbitrary exercise of American power, 
unmoored from basic due process considerations and disconnected from the 
law.  In addition, the Administration should move quickly to establish and 
publically explain an overriding policy framework to guide decisions about when 
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and under what circumstances suspected terrorists may be targeted.  This 
framework should also specifically spell out procedures for limiting civilian 
casualties.   
 
Ultimately, to borrow Audrey Kurth Cronin’s formulation, America’s goal should 
be a targeted killing program that is capable of effectively decapitating terrorist 
organizations through strikes that are “legally justified, transparent and rare.”51   
 
While I have attempted to prove the effectiveness of targeted attacks against 
terror suspects as a tool for advancing America’s interests, they are only that—
a tool.  Too often, Washington falls into the trap of embracing politically 
expedient shortcuts at the expense of real solutions.  While the available 
evidence suggests drone strikes are a potent, low-risk tactic in the struggle with 
Islamic extremism, it would be a mistake to confuse them for a winning 
strategy.  Despite the usefulness of these strikes as a means of undermining 
and disabling extremist groups, targeted American attacks alone will not secure 
a stable future for Afghanistan or Yemen, nor will they alter the global cultural 
and economic shifts that gave rise to Islamic fundamentalism in the first place.   
 
Strikes driven by improved intelligence have done significant damage to 
America’s enemies and set the stage for progress in troubled, anarchic regions 
from the Horn of Africa to the Arabian Peninsula to Central Asia.  However, 
realizing these gains will require incorporating drone capabilities into a broader 
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strategy that employs all of the elements of American power—from 
conventional military strength to public diplomacy to economic aid—to 
effectively undermine the extremist movements that threaten America’s 
security.  The United States must also undertake a serious effort to both 
sensibly reform and publically explain policies, especially the targeted killing 
program, that are the source of such profound outrage and alienation across 












































Chapter II: Improving Congressional Oversight of Drone Strikes: Is a Joint 





































In February 2014, Senator Carl Levin of Michigan, then-chairman of the Senate 
Armed Services Committee, called a classified hearing on U.S. drone strikes 
against suspected terrorists.  The Department of Defense and the CIA each 
operate separate drone programs and Levin asked senior officials from both to 
testify, knowing full well that his request was bound to cause consternation at 
Langley.  The CIA believes it answers only to the House and Senate Select 
Committees on Intelligence and has long resisted the efforts of other panels to 
scrutinize its activities.   
 
Inevitably, at the last minute, the White House stepped in and refused to allow 
the CIA to appear before Levin’s committee.  The administration also balked at 
providing the necessary security clearances for members of the House and 
Senate Armed Services Committees to be briefed on the details of the CIA 
program.  Ultimately, the hearing proceeded as planned but only military leaders 
testified before Levin and his colleagues.  According to aides quoted 
anonymously, the Michigan Senator’s efforts had “[run] aground on the 
Washington shoals of secrecy and turf…”52  As a result, a rare attempt to expand 
and intensify congressional oversight of CIA drone strikes was publically 
thwarted.   
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Drone warfare expert Micah Zenko of the Council on Foreign Relations has 
described congressional scrutiny of U.S. drone programs as “extremely poor.”53  
While the United Nations launched a comprehensive investigation of U.S. drone 
tactics last year54—Levin’s hearing aside—congressional interest in the topic has 
been notably limited.  As described in my first chapter, though U.S. drone strikes 
have proven effective at decapitating extremist groups, drone warfare’s net 
security value to the United States is diminished by its marked tendency to 
alienate the affected populations, inflaming anti-American sentiment among the 
very people whose hearts and minds the United States has worked so hard to 
win.  This argues for a far more constrained, selective and transparent targeted 
killing program.  However, given the meager role that Congress has played in 
overseeing CIA drone strikes thus far, it seems unlikely that lawmakers will 
choose to pursue these badly-needed reforms.  
 
Inadequate oversight of drone operations is indicative of a much wider pattern of 
inadequate congressional monitoring of clandestine operations.  Troublingly, 
even when Congress has taken its oversight responsibilities seriously, the CIA 
has responded with obfuscation or worse.  Based on an investigation by the 
Senate Intelligence Committee, it now appears the CIA intentionally misled 
Congress about its controversial enhanced interrogation program, including the 
techniques that were employed and the value of the information that was 
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extracted using these unrelentingly severe methods.55  Further, Senator Diane 
Feinstein, chair of the panel, has alleged that the CIA went so far as to spy on 
the congressional staffers who were conducting the inquiry.56  
 
Perhaps the last time this much attention was paid to the nation’s intelligence 
community and so many questions were asked of its congressional overseers 
was in the wake of the September 11th attacks.  Then, the national media wanted 
to know how a small group of terrorists with limited means had successfully 
evaded the attentions of federal agencies with collective budgets in the tens of 
billions of dollars.  When the 9/11 Commission issued its final report in July 2004, 
it roundly criticized the effectiveness of the current oversight structure and 
proposed “centralizing and strengthening oversight of intelligence and homeland 
security issues.”57  Specifically, the Commission recommended that Congress 
consider the creation of a joint congressional committee, modeled on the now-
defunct Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, with broad powers to oversee and 
reform the nation’s intelligence apparatus.   
 
In light of the critical importance of improving the conduct of American 
clandestine programs, including drone warfare, now would seem to be an 
opportune time to revisit this idea.  What does the historical record tell us about 
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the implications of establishing this kind of joint committee and would such a 
panel have done more to prevent the recent series of high-profile abuses by U.S. 
intelligence agencies? 
 
The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE) was exceptionally powerful and 
extremely effective, guiding all aspects of American nuclear policy—both civilian 
and military—for more than three decades.  In contrast to the obstructionist 
tactics employed by the modern CIA, the executive branch was highly responsive 
to the demands of the JCAE.  In fact, the Committee grew to be so powerful that 
it effectively became a co-decision maker alongside the executive.  However, 
over time, this led to relationships with nuclear agencies that were seamless and 
overly-sympathetic.  Moreover, from its inception, the Committee was not an 
objective overseer of nuclear programs, but rather a staunch supporter of 
expanding the American nuclear enterprise.   
 
Based on this record, while the creation of a Joint Committee on Intelligence 
would no doubt bolster Congress’ power vis-à-vis the intelligence community, it 
would do nothing to improve the independence or objectivity of congressional 
oversight.  In fact, the formation of such a panel would likely have the exact 
opposite effect.  Instead of seeking to further concentrate authority over 
intelligence matters, Congress should consider alternative approaches.  As 
discussed in the conclusion, one option is to provide for greater diffusion of 
oversight responsibility within the legislative branch.  Allowing more members 
43 
 
and committees to have a say in the nation’s intelligence policies might 
marginally compromise secrecy, but it could also encourage more vigorous 
oversight and debate on issues of critical importance to the health of our 
democracy.    
 
Constraints on Congressional Oversight 
Leslie Harris of the Center for Democracy and Technology has argued that 
“secret law and secret oversight is an oxymoron.”58  The imperative to keep 
information and debate about the nation’s intelligence policies out of the public 
domain, she believes, renders truly effective congressional oversight nearly 
impossible.  While that may be an extreme view, the literature does describe a 
range of factors that collectively constrain the strength, effectiveness and 
independence congressional efforts to oversee the intelligence community. 
 
According to an analysis by the Congressional Research Service (CRS), the 
most significant constraint on meaningful oversight is the “high degree and 
pervasiveness of secrecy surrounding intelligence policy, activities, operations, 
resources, and personnel.”59  These secrecy requirements severely circumscribe 
what information can be shared by the intelligence community and with whom.  
They also dictate when and under what circumstances that information can be 
debated by Members of Congress.  Further, these requirements proscribe the 
extent to which the expertise of both congressional staff and non-governmental 
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actors can be leveraged to analyze classified materials and provide informed 
input to lawmakers.  Consequently, says CRS, we are left with a “system that is 
too often closed to outsiders—not just the general public but also 
Representatives and Senators who do not have seats on the select committees 
on intelligence.”60 
 
Because of the overriding imperative to maintain secrecy at all times, 
congressional oversight functions differently in the intelligence context than in 
other policy-making realms.  McCubbins and Schwartz, in one of the most widely 
cited models of oversight, argue that lawmakers operate much like firefighters, 
jumping into the fray only when things go badly wrong and outside interest 
groups begin clamoring for congressional action.  This conception, writes Amy 
Zegart, may be useful in explaining patterns in other issue areas but it has little 
relevance to intelligence policy.  She notes, for example, the almost total 
absence of “interest groups on the scene.”61  Moreover, as Jennifer Kibbe 
observes, the media, which often plays a key role in overseeing other key 
government functions, is severely restricted in its ability to act as a watchdog 
when it comes to the intelligence community.62   
 
As a result, lawmakers are less likely to be prodded into action by outside forces 
and less likely to have the benefit of the expertise and perspectives of outside 
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groups should they choose to pursue new reforms.  This means members of 
Congress tasked with overseeing the intelligence community face a unique set of 
challenges.  As former Senator Lee Hamilton explained in 2007, “If you’re the 
chairman of a committee that works in the unclassified world, you get a lot of 
help: lots of reporters bring issues to your attention, trade associations write 
reports, citizens speak up…all kinds of things.  Not so in the classified world.  
The world of intelligence is vast.  It is closed and it is complicated.”63  
 
These obstacles are exacerbated by the meager resources available to support 
the members of the Intelligence Committees in exercising their oversight 
responsibilities.  While the size and complexity of the intelligence community has 
grown dramatically in the decade since 9-11, the number of congressional staff 
assigned to the intelligence panels has failed to keep pace.  Consequently, 
according to Allen Miller, the committees are “overtaxed and unduly burdened.”  
Indeed, he writes, “Staffers are vastly outnumbered—the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence has 12 staff members who review the activities of tens 
of thousands of agents, personnel, and programs.”64   
 
Regardless, many lawmakers have little appetite for the mostly thankless task of 
intelligence oversight.  In addition to its complexity, legislative work in this area 
comes with grave responsibilities and few tangible benefits.  According to Miller, 
considerable effort is required to gain mastery of the subject material and this 
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effort generally yields little in the way of headline-grabbing benefits for 
constituents back home.65  “No member ever gets a bridge built or a road paved 
by serving on the intelligence committee,” quipped former CIA Director Michael 
V. Hayden, “It’s an act of patriotism.”66   
 
Members also serve for relatively short periods of time on the two intelligence 
panels.  While the Senate abolished term-limits in 2005, with the exception of the 
Chair and Raking Member, the House continues to block members from serving 
more than four terms on its intelligence committee.  As a result, members are 
relatively less experienced and arguably less prepared to effectively carry out 
their oversight responsibilities on this panel than on others in Congress.   
 
Zegart notes that between 1975 and 2008, lawmakers who had served more 
than a decade in Congress represented 32 percent and 23 percent, respectively, 
of the members of the Senate Banking and Armed Services Committees.  The 
comparable figure for the Intelligence Committee was only 15 percent.  She 
contends that term-limits have effectively served to diminish the ability of 
members to gain critical “on-the-job training” in intelligence issues.67   
 
Other institutional barriers continue to hamper effective oversight.  For example, 
when they face stubborn opposition from the Intelligence Committees, the 
intelligence agencies can sometimes go to the House and Senate Defense 
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Appropriations Subcommittees to get what they want.  Hamilton recalled that the 
House Intelligence Committee was frequently bypassed in this manner in the 
mid-1980’s.   
 
While other authorizing committees may face similar challenges, this problem is 
especially acute for the Intelligence Committees because secrecy requirements 
inhibit effective coordination with the House and Senate appropriators.  As Zegart 
observes, “In the classified world…it’s much harder for one committee to know or 
object to what another committee is doing.”  As a result, it’s relatively easy for the 
CIA to “get away with gaming the system.”68                             
 
It’s worth noting that the House and Senate Defense Appropriations 
Subcommittees are even less equipped to perform effective oversight of the 
intelligence community than the authorizing panels.  According to Kibbe, with so 
many high-profile, expensive programs under their jurisdiction, defense 
appropriators have limited resources to devote to querying intelligence programs 
and the intelligence community’s funding requests therefore receive relatively 
little scrutiny.69  As former Senator Kit Bond frankly admitted, “The Appropriations 
Committee can’t give intelligence the attention it deserves.”70 
 
Oversight is further impeded by the flawed “Gang of Eight” process for making 
the legislative branch aware of certain covert activities.  Under “extraordinary 
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circumstances” the President may brief the leadership of both chambers as well 
as the chairs and ranking members of the Intelligence Committees in order to 
fulfill his legal responsibility to keep Congress “fully and currently informed” of 
such operations.  However, as Kibbe notes, no staff are permitted to attend these 
briefings and members are even prohibited from taking notes.  Further, the 
individual Senators and Representatives who comprise this select group may be 
briefed at different times, preventing them from discussing the relevant facts as 
they are presented.  In addition, they are barred from sharing what they learn 
during these sessions with their colleagues, including other members of the 
Intelligence Committees.   
 
Perhaps most importantly, according to Kibbe, it is unclear what recourse 
congressional leaders would have if they objected to a particular covert action or 
program described during a “Gang of Eight” briefing.  They obviously couldn’t 
hold a press conference to voice their concerns.  More troublingly, in such a 
scenario, they would even face significant obstacles in attempting to exercise 
Congress’ traditional power of the purse.  As Kibbe explains, “It is difficult to cut 
off funding for a program when you cannot describe the risks that you feel it 
presents.”71 
 
While the “Gang of Eight” process is thankfully used only sparingly, according to 
the literature, Members of Congress also encounter barriers even in their more 
mundane oversight efforts.  For example, committee attempts to obtain general 
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information about classified programs are routinely thwarted by the intelligence 
community and the CIA and other agencies regularly fail to produce reports 
required by Congress.  In addition, as the Guardian has reported, questions 
posed by individual members who are not on the panel are rarely entertained at 
all.72  Further, briefings provided by the intelligence agencies to the committees 
on covert programs and operations are often woefully inadequate.  Kibbe quotes 
former Senate Intelligence Committee chairman Jay Rockefeller who describes 
those he received as “superficial” and “inconsequential.”   
 
For all that, the most basic factor limiting effective oversight may lie with the 
members of Congress themselves.  The available evidence, including the most 
recent scandals which have engulfed the intelligence establishment, strongly 
indicated that the leaders of the Intelligence Committees are too close to the 
agencies they are charged with overseeing.  Instead of scrutiny and skepticism, 
the committee chairs and ranking members too often offer only unquestioning 
support to America’s intelligence agencies.  Moreover, as Miller writes, some 
members actually believe vigorous oversight will weaken the nation’s intelligence 
capabilities.  “….many members of the House and Senate…believe that 
Congressional micromanagement could prevent the CIA from reaching its full 
potential and impede intelligence operations if oversight went too far.”  According 
to Miller, when it comes to the CIA, “Congress does not want to do anything to 
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threaten its stability or its ability to command respect.”73  This attitude has 
produced apathy and indifference where—as in monitoring of NSA surveillance 
programs—vigilance and careful attention to detail were badly needed.          
 
In summary, weak and ineffectual oversight of the intelligence community by a 
Congress is the result of a range of factors.  Secrecy requirements prevent open 
debate and inhibit effective collaboration between Members and committees.74  
There are also limited incentives for Members to devote time and energy to their 
work on the intelligence panels as this service does little to enhance 
their reputations and delivers few tangible benefits to their constituents.  In 
additional, committees lack sufficient staff resources in light of the sprawling size 
of the intelligence establishment.  Further, unlike education, taxation, defense or 
any number of other areas of policy, few outside interest groups bring issues and 
concerns to the Members’ attention regarding the nation’s intelligence 
programs.75 But perhaps most importantly, poor oversight is a consequence of 
the fact that too many members of the select committees on intelligence are 
overly sympathetic or unduly deferential to the agencies they have a 
constitutionally-mandated responsibility to oversee.   
 
The 9-11 Commission and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy  
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In seeking to rectify the shortcomings that allowed the September 11th hijackers 
to evade American intelligence, the 9-11 Commission recognized the importance 
of improving congressional oversight.  Without strong oversight, the Commission 
reasoned, other efforts to enhance the management and coordination of 
intelligence activities would inevitably be undermined.   
 
The Commissioned offered a damning verdict on Congress’ approach to 
intelligence matters, arguing that the House and Senate intelligence committees 
“lack the power, influence and sustained capabilities”76 needed to guide the 
intelligence community through the challenges it would face in the post-9/11 
world.  Among other options, it recommended that Congress consider the 
formation of a joint committee, cast in the mold of the Joint Committee on Atomic 
Energy, which would empower “a relative small group of members of Congress, 
given time and reason to master the subject and the agencies, to conduct 
oversight of the intelligence establishment and be clearly accountable for its 
work.”77 
 
Given the fact that the 9-11 Commission specifically cited the Joint Committee on 
Atomic Energy, it’s worth examining the record the JCAE accumulated over the 
course of more than three decades to determine whether this model would, in 
fact, offer an antidote to the problems currently plaguing congressional oversight 
of intelligence.  Despite concerning itself with a seemingly unrelated set of issues 
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and programs, there are strong parallels between the JCAE and the modern 
intelligence committees.  For example, like the intelligence panels, the JCAE had 
jurisdiction over a number of highly classified programs, and was therefore forced 
to contend with comparable secrecy restrictions.78  It also operated at a time 
when the issues under its jurisdiction were the subject of great public interest and 
scrutiny.  Moreover, just as in the post-9/11 context, the Committee was situated 
in a political environment immeasurably influenced by the threats the nation 
faced at the time, specifically from a Soviet Union that appeared menacing and 
militarily formidable.   
 
Key to evaluating the 9-11 Commission’s recommendation is assessing the 
JCAE’s power, effectiveness and independence.  Was it capable of compelling 
the Executive to acquiesce to its requests for information and other demands?  
Could it effectively pursue its policy goals?  And was the JCAE objective and 
impartial in guiding the American nuclear enterprise?  Answering these questions 
will help to shed new light on how a panel shaped in the JCAE’s image—a 
potential Joint Committee on Intelligence—would likely operate and whether it 
would succeed in enhancing congressional oversight of the intelligence 
community.   
 
The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy was an entirely unique entity—a panel 
without peer in contemporary American history.  In 1962, Green and Rosenthal, 
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the Committee’s preeminent chroniclers, summed up the JCAE thusly, “…in 
terms of its sustained influence within the Congress, its impact and influence on 
the executive branch, and its accomplishments, [it is] probably the most powerful 
congressional committee in the history of the nation.”79  The Committee was 
armed with extraordinary powers, wielded unparalleled influence over its 
exclusive jurisdictional territory and, in time, grew to become a “kind of quasi-
administrative legislative agency” that played an unprecedented role in the 
decisions made at the agencies it oversaw.80   
 
To a large extent, this uniqueness was the product of the unusual circumstances 
of the Committee’s birth.  The JCAE was formed as a counterweight to the 
Atomic Energy Commission, a body whose mission was to, “foster and control 
the peacetime development of atomic science and technology,” effectively 
governing all civilian and military nuclear programs in the United States.81  In 
order to oversee such an inherently powerful executive agency, Congress felt 
compelled to establish a Committee with a unique structure and extraordinary 
powers of its own.   
 
Like the current select committees, members of the JCAE were appointed by the 
Speaker Pro Tempore of the Senate and by the Speaker of the House.  They 
tended to be have significant seniority and were often drawn from the Foreign 
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Affairs and Armed Services Committees.  Beginning in 1951, by rule, three of the 
Senate members of the JCAE were required to also hold positions on the 
Appropriations Committee.  (The House declined to institute a similar 
arrangement.)  Unlike the intelligence committees, the JCAE never imposed term 
limits and members who joined the panel were not required to give up one of 
their other committee assignments.  Consequently, part of the attraction for 
would-be members was that the JCAE was essentially a bonus or “extra 
committee.”82  The result of these factors was that the Committee came to be 
populated by many of the most powerful, longest tenured members of 
Congress—men of great stature within the institution.  They were “statesmen” 
and “old hands in Congress…accustomed to its traditions and mores.”83  Their 
collective clout added immeasurably to the JCAE’s power.   
 
The Committee’s influence was also strengthened by the unique legislative 
procedures under which it operated.  After the JCAE debated and approved 
legislation, identical reports were sent to both chambers.  Once these bills 
reached the floor, other members of Congress typically deferred to the JCAE, 
given the technical complexity and secrecy of nuclear matters.84  In those cases 
where the House and Senate ultimately produced different versions of the same 
bill, the JCAE would then serve as its own conference committee for the 
purposes of reaching consensus on the legislation.  Thus, at every stage of the 
                                                          
82
 Christopher M. Davis, “9/11 Commission Recommendations: Joint Committee on Atomic Energy – A 
Model for Congressional Oversight,” Congressional Research Service, October 2004, pg 13 
83
 Ibid, pg 10 
84
 Harold P. Green and Alan Rosenthal, Government of the Atom, pg 78 
55 
 
legislative process—from inception through to final passage—the Committee’s 
members wielded significant power over all aspects of legislation that dealt with 
nuclear energy.   
 
Unfortunately, this structure had the effect of curtailing meaningful debate and 
served to limit the policy alternatives available to Congress as a whole.  
Members outside of the Committee were essentially presented with a fait 
accompli – bills almost certain to become law.  According to Green and 
Rosenthal, writing in 1963, “On atomic energy legislation…the JCAE is the court 
of first and, probably, last appeal.”85         
 
However, even more significant than its strength within the legislative branch was 
the control the JCAE exerted over the agencies it oversaw.  In fact, thanks to 
legislation passed in 1954, the entire executive branch was required to turn over 
any and all information requested by the Committee regarding activities that were 
related to the field of atomic energy.  And unlike the intelligence committees, 
which have long complained about the intelligence community’s reluctance to 
adhere to the panels’ requests for information, the JCAE achieved a notable 
degree of compliance with its oversight demands.86   
 
In addition to its expansive ability to acquire information, the Committee was also 
granted the authority under the Atomic Energy Act to utilize the resources of the 
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agencies it oversaw for its own purposes.87  Though it rarely happened in 
practice, the JCAE was thus legally empowered to order executive branch 
personnel to investigate their own organizations on behalf of the Committee.  
According to critics, “this had the effect of blurring the line between the JCAE and 
the executive agency it was tasked with overseeing, making the panel, in 
essence, a ‘legislative-administrative hybrid’…”88   
 
The Committee could also review executive branch actions not just after the fact, 
as almost every other committee typically does, but while they were in the 
process of being considered as well.89  This gave the JCAE the ability to 
essentially veto decisions it found objectionable.  “In this regard,” a 
Congressional Research Service analysis found, “the JCAE often acted as a co-
decision maker with the Executive, not simply an observer of actions or decision 
that had already occurred.”90  As a result, the Atomic Energy Commission, which 
the Committee had originally been established to oversee, became less an 
independent board dictating national nuclear policy with input from Congress and 
more a subordinate body operating under the direction of the JCAE.   
 
The fact that the Committee came to influence policy not just through the 
passage of legislation but by playing a direct role in agency decision-making 
contributed to the development of unusual relationships between the Committee 
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and the agencies it oversaw.  These arrangements, especially with the Atomic 
Energy Commission and the Pentagon, were so close that they became virtually 
“seamless.”91  Influence also flowed in the opposite direction.  For example, it 
was reported at the time that a Navy Admiral – Hyman G. Hickover – held 
inappropriate sway over the committee on issues related to nuclear-powered 
ships and submarines.92   
 
These relationships were abetted by the fact that the Committee was rarely 
skeptical of nuclear power.  Instead, the panel was collectively and 
enthusiastically committed to advancing the role of nuclear energy in the 
American economy and in the nation’s armed forces.  This mission was the 
animating force that drove much of the Committee’s work over its three decades 
of existence.  However, the same dynamic would prove to be the panel’s 
undoing.  When nuclear power fell out of favor among liberals in the 1970’s, they 
quickly turned on the Committee, accusing the panel of being in the pocket of the 
nuclear lobby and of concerning itself only with the unquestioning expansion of 
nuclear power.  Finally, in August 1977, under pressure from rank-and-file 
Democrats, the House and Senate leadership decided to abolish the 
Committee.93   
 
Is a Joint Committee on Intelligence the Answer?  
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The JCAE was shaped by the congressional leaders who guided the panel and 
by the specific circumstances in which it arose.  In many respects, the Committee 
was the product of a unique era in American history – a time when the Cold War 
was at its height and before Three Mile Island and Chernobyl irrevocably altered 
the public’s view of nuclear power.  Yet, despite its distinctiveness, the story of 
the JCAE still can help to shed light on how structural factors impact the quality 
of congressional oversight, enabling us to better assess the potential implications 
of replacing the current select committees with a single Joint Committee on 
Intelligence.   
 
Returning the questions posed at the outset, based of the historical record, was 
the Committee powerful, effective and independent?  And would a joint 
intelligence committee modeled on the JCAE provide stronger, more effective 
and more independent oversight of the intelligence community than the current 
structure in Congress has permitted?   
 
As described above, the JCAE certainly wielded great strength and was 
exceptionally successful, both legislatively and through other means, in pursuing 
a policy agenda of nuclear expansion.  However, the Committee was far from 
independent or objective.  And this finding, perhaps more than any other 
consideration, should give us pause in considering the appropriateness of the 
joint committee model for the task of intelligence oversight, including oversight of 




Beginning with the question of clout, the creation of a joint committee would 
almost certainly help to redress the balance of power between Congress and the 
executive.  First, thanks in part to the fact that it was a joint committee, the JCAE 
was highly prestigious and counted among its members some of the most 
formidable figures in Congress, including a future President in Lyndon B. 
Johnson.  (As described above, membership was made especially attractive by 
the fact that members who joined the JCAE were not required to give up one of 
their other committee slots.)  A Joint Committee on Intelligence, like the JCAE, 
would likely draw from the foremost members of the current Intelligence, Armed 
Services, and Foreign Affairs Committees.  Membership would presumably be 
more esteemed and attractive than a place on the current select committees on 
intelligence.  It would thus encourage members to take an active role on the 
panel and to devote more of their scarce time and energy to the generally 
thankless task of intelligence oversight.   
 
A committee with such a formidable membership might also encourage greater 
compliance with requests for information.  The JCAE, in part because of the 
close relationships it fostered with the Executive, was highly successful in 
compelling agencies to meet its oversight demands.  Moreover, under a Joint 
Committee on Intelligence, the intelligence community would receive a single set 
of requests from a single, powerful committee, making these requests much 




Next, on the issue of effectiveness, the staff resources to both generate inquiries 
and analyze agency responses would also likely be enhanced with the creation 
of a joint committee.  The JCAE had a substantially larger staff than most other 
contemporary committees94 and the formation of a new intelligence panel would 
give Congress the opportunity to examine the need for additional staff at a time 
when the intelligence community has never been larger or better funded.  
Furthermore, merging the staffs of the current intelligence panels would allow 
Congress to eliminate redundancies and concentrate staff resources, potentially 
strengthening the legislation branch’s oversight capabilities.   
 
All of this speaks to another crucial benefit that a joint committee would provide 
Congress – improved coordination.  The secrecy requirements inherent in 
intelligence oversight prevent open debate and inhibit effective collaboration 
between Members and committees.  The creation of a single committee with 
jurisdiction over the entire intelligence community would make it far easier for 
congressional decision-makers to confer with one another, share new proposals, 
debate contentious issues and provide unified guidance to intelligence agencies.  
This structure would also make it harder for executive branch leaders to bypass 
or ignore certain committees to get what they want.  Ultimately, where unanimity 
existed among its members, the formation of a joint committee would enable 
Congress to speak to the Intelligence Community with one voice. 
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These benefits are significant and they would help to both address the 
intelligence community’s intransigence in the face of congressional demands for 
information and provide improved coordination, resources and institutional 
attention to intelligence oversight.  However, it seems highly unlikely that a Joint 
Committee would have pursued the reforms necessary to reduce civilian 
causalities from drone strikes or address NSA overreach.  What’s lacking—just 
as in the example of the JCAE—is true independence.  Indeed, congressional 
indifference to these abuses is more a product of the strong inclination of the 
leaders of the intelligence panels to support the policies and perspectives of the 
intelligence community than the result of any other deficiency in the way 
Congress approaches the task of oversight.   
 
The current state of congressional oversight of intelligence is a direct 
manifestation of what the former clerk of the House Oversight and Government 
Reform Committee, Larry Halloran, has termed “congressional Stockholm 
syndrome”—the tendency of members of Congress and their staffs to, over time, 
adopt the views of the agencies they are charged with overseeing.95  And based 
on the example of the JCAE, greater concentration of oversight responsibilities 
would do little to disrupt this corrosive phenomenon.  
 
The JCAE was marked by a blurring of the lines between the branches of 
government and by the close relationships the committee maintained with 
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Administration officials.  As described above, the Committee came to play an 
active role in the decision-making process of the executive branch on nuclear 
matters—not just reviewing actions after the fact, but directing agency leaders on 
key policy questions.  Because of these close relationships, certain figures in the 
Administration also grew to wield undue sway over the committee’s members, 
seriously compromising their independence.  Perhaps most significantly, the 
JCAE never served as a detached, dispassionate observer of nuclear matters.  
Instead, over the course of its history, the Committee aggressively pursued an 
agenda of nuclear growth and proliferation.   
 
This is precisely the dynamic that Congress should be seeking to curtail—not 
encourage—in the oversight of the intelligence community.  Instead of fostering 
closer, more sympathetic relationships with the intelligence community, Congress 
should work to reestablish its independence and once again become a thorough 
scrutinizer, not just an unthinking enabler, of the CIA and the other intelligence 
agencies.  Unfortunately, reducing the number of members of Congress with a 
say in intelligence matters would do nothing to further this goal.  If anything, it 
would make the “syndrome” Halloran described more likely.   
 
Based on the JCAE’s record, there’s a strong chance that the membership of a 
Joint Committee on Intelligence would gradually adopt an even more 
sympathetic—possibly even sycophantic—view of the intelligence community 
than the current select committees already have.  Further, it’s entirely possible 
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that the committee could adopt as its mission the promotion of the powers of the 
intelligence agencies, just as the JCAE sought to promote the power of the 
Atomic Energy Commission, which could have a range of serious negative 
consequences, especially for American civil liberties.  And troublingly, were a 
new Joint Committee on Intelligence to implement the same legislative 
procedures as the JCAE, there would be fewer opportunities for other members 
of Congress to meaningfully object.     
  
Conclusion: Congress Should Consider Other Options to Improve Intelligence 
Oversight 
Recent scandals have once again called into question the adequacy of 
congressional oversight of the intelligence community.  The legislative branch’s 
efforts in this area are hamstrung by a series of structural barriers, including: 
secrecy requirements that prevent open debate; limited incentives for Members 
to devote time and energy to their work on the intelligence panels; and the 
inability of outside interest groups to participate in the policy-making process.  
More significantly, the intelligence committees have arguably become overly 
sympathetic to the perspectives of the agencies they oversee and have therefore 
failed to appropriately scrutinize the executive branch’s intelligence policies.   
 
Among the most prominent proposals to address these shortcomings—and one 
that was endorsed by the 9-11 Commission—is the creation of a Joint Committee 
on Intelligence modeled on the Joint Committee on Nuclear Energy.  Based on 
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the JCAE’s record, while such a committee would strengthen Congress’ hand 
relative to the executive, it would do nothing to enhance the independence of 
congressional oversight of intelligence and would probably have the opposite 
effect.  Moreover, it’s highly questionable whether a joint committee would be any 
more likely to query the collateral damage caused by American drones or the 
manifold other deficiencies inherent in American targeted killing policies. 
 
Congress would be wise to consider alternative approaches to this challenge.  
Larry Halloran has argued that effective oversight rarely emanates from a single 
source and is often the product of multiple committees pursuing distinct goals 
and agendas.96  Congressional leaders and academics should therefore examine 
whether a greater diffusion of oversight responsibility within the legislative branch 
would help to produce stronger results.   
 
For a start, lawmakers like Senator Levin who have sought to review the nation’s 
drone policies from the vantage point of other committees should be encouraged 
instead of stonewalled.  While this proposal might raise the potential for more 
unauthorized leaks of sensitive information, it could also help to meet the critical 
need for more robust, independent, objective and multifaceted oversight of the 
intelligence community—something the House and Senate intelligence 
committees have manifestly failed to deliver.   
 
   














Chapter III – Hostile Take-Over: Should the U.S. Military Assume  






































In 2013, President Obama proposed granting sole control of drone operations to 
the Department of Defense—a move that would strip the CIA of the key role it 
has played in this domain over the past decade.  To date, this momentous reform 
still has yet to be implemented.  However, if it does eventually come to pass, 
such a significant transfer of responsibility could have far-reaching ramifications 
for not for just who controls American drone operations but for how they are 
conducted.   
 
In this chapter, I review a recent strike which has served to reignite debate over 
the President’s proposal and examine the political factors which have prevented 
his vision from being achieved.  I then weigh the competing arguments for and 
against military control of drone operations and conclude that this consolidation 
would likely improve the transparency of drone operations but that other benefits 
will only be realized if this transformative action can be leveraged to produce 
other much-needed improvements in the conduct of American drone warfare. 
 
A drone strike gone wrong revives hopes for reform 
In April, the Obama administration announced to reporters that two Al Qaeda 
hostages held in Pakistan—aid workers Warren Weinstein of the United States 
and Giovanni Lo Porto of Italy—had died four months prior.  They perished, the 
White House disclosed, not at the hands of their captors but instead when 
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missiles fired from an American drone hovering thousands of feet overhead 
obliterated the terrorists’ compound.   
 
Despite hundreds of hours of surveillance, U.S. officials had been completely 
unaware that the two men were imprisoned in a building that the CIA had 
earmarked for destruction.  In fact, it had taken weeks for intelligence analysts to 
piece together the clues necessary to determine that an American strike had 
ended the lives of two men U.S. intelligence was desperate to locate. 97  Perhaps 
surprisingly, it also emerged that Weinstein had not been the only American to 
die in the explosion.  Again unbeknownst to the CIA, a U.S. citizen named 
Ahmed Farouq who had risen to become the deputy head of Al Qaeda’s 
operations in India also met an untimely end in the strike.98   
 
On a personal level, the incident anguished President Obama who, after 
telephoning Weinstein’s widow, reportedly told aides that it marked one of the 
low points of his time in office.  The strike also served to reignite public debate 
over the President’s policies regarding the use of drones against suspected 
terrorists.  For critics, it was galling that the CIA had decided to destroy a building 
and kill all of its occupants without clear knowledge of who was inside.   
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Opponents of U.S. drone strikes also took the Obama administration to task for 
eliminating Farouq—an American citizen—without any semblance of due 
process.  (Obama officials subsequently responded that they were unaware of 
the Qaeda operative’s citizenship status at the time the strike was authorized.)99   
 
More broadly, this attack arguably bears the hallmarks of the shortcomings 
identified in Chapter I.  The fact that it took the Administration months to uncover 
the truth of what had transpired—and longer still to reveal what they had found to 
the American public—speaks to the unnecessary and corrosive layers of secrecy 
that surround the CIA drone program.  In addition, the fact that a strike was 
authorized when so little was apparently known about the building being targeted 
is indicative of a lack of selectivity which has long characterized American use of 
armed drones against suspected extremists.  As described in previous chapters, 
this failure to exercise sufficient caution and discretion in authorizing drone 
strikes has alienated local populations and served to undermine the pursuit of 
broader U.S. objectives in the struggle against Islamic extremism.  Put another 
way, as a result of poor policies and questionable decision-making, drone strikes 
have too often produced tactical gains at the expense of progress towards 
American strategic aims in this conflict.     
 
Interestingly, criticism of this unfortunate incident and of the Obama 
administration’s approach to drone warfare in general has revived a key reform 
proposed by President Obama himself—one that has been blocked by Congress 





and an uncooperative intelligence establishment.  More than two years ago, the 
President called for transferring full control of drone operations from the CIA to 
the Department of Defense, which operates its own parallel drone program.  This 
idea, though widely touted at the time, was not entirely novel.  Even before the 
advent of America’s targeted killing program, the 9/11 Commission 
recommended that responsibility for all covert military operations should shift to 
the Defense Department.”100   
 
However, despite some initial momentum and continuing support from prominent 
members of both political parties, the move had apparently stalled until recently.  
Ensnared in the squabbling between rival bureaucracies, it seemed likely that the 
targeted killing of terror suspects would remain a prerogative of the intelligence 
agency for some time to come.  However, following the deaths of Weinstein and 
Lo Porto, it appears this reform has gained renewed traction, at least in the 
media and in Congress, if not in the intelligence community. 
 
In his remarks after announcing the botched strike, President Obama averred 
that, “…one of the things that sets America apart from many other nations, one of 
the things that makes us exceptional, is our willingness to confront squarely our 
imperfections and to learn from our mistakes.”101  But what is the right lesson to 
take from this tragic event?  Among other steps, should the hostages’ deaths 
finally compel the U.S. government to adopt the President’s proposal and remove 
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responsibility for drone strikes from the CIA’s purview?  Would this single reform 
be enough to meaningfully address the deficiencies described in Chapter I?   
 
While there are a number of complicated and sometimes contradictory factors to 
consider, on balance, the answer is probably ‘yes.’  However, any improvements 
in the performance of U.S. drone programs will almost certainly not be achieved 
through this shift alone.  Instead, they will be realized only if the handover of 
responsibility to DOD serves as a catalyst for—and is implemented in concert 
with—other long-overdue and badly-needed reforms.        
           
The politics of drone reform 
The United States operates two independent drone programs—one run by the 
CIA and the other by the U.S. military’s Joint Special Operations Command 
(JSOC).  While the unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV’s)102 that America’s spies and 
its uniformed commanders fly are largely the same and possess nearly identical 
capabilities, where and how these drones are used is distinctly different.  The 
military program is largely confined to the airspace above the traditional 
battlefield—primarily over Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya.  DOD drones also fly 
missions over countries whose governments have acquiesced to their presence, 
such as Yemen (at least until recently), as well as over Somalia, which doesn’t 
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have a functioning government and therefore cannot object to American missile 
strikes against its citizens.103   
 
In contrast, the CIA program operates over states that have either expressly 
denied the use of their airspace for American military operations or—more 
commonly—are keen to rid themselves of extremist elements but have found the 
deniability afforded by the covert CIA program to be politically expedient.  The 
most notable country in this category is Pakistan.  Not long after the U.S. –led 
invasion of Afghanistan, the Pakistani government quietly negotiated a pact that 
allowed the CIA to conduct drone strikes in the country’s lawless northern tribal 
areas.  Per the agreement, these attacks on Taliban forces would go unattributed 
and the U.S. government would deny all responsibility for any casualties at the 
hands of American drone operators situated thousands of miles away.  To date, 
this arrangement has proven mutually beneficial.  American strikes have killed 
hundreds of extremists while Pakistani authorities have faced relatively little 
political blowback despite the collateral damage inflicted by these attacks and in 
spite of the clear infringement of the country’s sovereignty that American drones 
operating overhead would seem to represent.104                   
 
These disparities between the DOD and CIA programs are rooted in differences 
in the legal frameworks that authorize the two organizations.  Like all other 
military operations, the Department of Defense’s drone activities are directed by 
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Title 10 of the United States code.  The DOD program, in sharp contrast to its 
CIA counterpart, also operates according to publically available military doctrine.  
Specifically, Joint Publication 3-60 outlines “steps in the joint targeting cycle,” 
explaining in detail how and under what circumstances drone strikes are to be 
launched against suspected enemies of the United States.105  In contrast, the 
activities of UAV’s operated by the CIA fall under Title 50, which defines what 
constitutes “covert actions” and severely limits public disclosures about these 
operations.106  As a result—and by design—much less is known about the 
procedures that govern targeted killings conducted by the CIA. 
 
The purposeful, consuming secrecy that defines CIA drone operations has 
attracted sharp criticism since drone strikes ramped up in the early 2000’s.  
Indeed, for years, the U.S. government refused to even acknowledge the 
program’s existence and has only reluctantly begun to disclose the policy 
parameters and legal strictures within which it operates.107  This led prominent 
critics—among them Micah Zenko of the Council on Foreign Relations, Rachel 
Stohl of the Stimson Center and Congressman Adam Schiff (D-CA), now the 
Ranking Member on the House Select Committee on Intelligence—to argue that 
shifting responsibility for drone warfare from the shadowy realm of the CIA to the 
“relative sunlight” of DOD was urgently needed to increase transparency108.   
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To his credit, after a lengthy period of contemplation, President Obama 
eventually reached the same conclusion.  In a closely watched 2013 speech at 
the National Defense University, he signaled his support for granting sole 
ownership of the targeted killing program to the Department of Defense.  This 
change does not require the passage of new legislation by a recalcitrant 
Congress and could presumably be implemented by the Commander in Chief 
with the mere stroke of a pen.  Yet, in a sign both of the limits of the President’s 
power—even within his own administration—and of the strength of the opposition 
that the proposal faces, two years have passed and the CIA’s role in U.S. drone 
warfare operations remains undiminished.    
 
One of the most frequently-cited reasons for the lack of progress towards the 
President’s preferred policy is an amendment reportedly attached to a classified 
annex of the Senate version of last year’s Defense Appropriations Act by Senator 
Diane Feinstein (D-CA).  Though her office has declined to comment, press 
reports indicate that the measure inserted into the spending bill by the former 
Chairwoman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence prevents the 
transfer of authority over drone operations to DOD unless the Secretary of 
Defense certifies that this change will not adversely affect the war of terror.109  
While this certification requirement may not seem like an insurmountable barrier, 
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to date it has apparently served to prevent President Obama from implementing 
a reform he promised more than two years ago.               
         
To some extent, this lack of progress—like so many things in Washington—is 
more about power than about the merits of the policy in question.  Feinstein may 
sincerely believe that the CIA is better equipped to handle the targeted killing 
mission than the U.S. military.  However, as a rule, congressional committees 
jealously guard their turf and it is certainly possible that California’s senior 
senator has championed the CIA’s role in drone operations in part because she 
is loath to see such a critical instrument of American force projection slip from the 
Intelligence panel’s exclusive jurisdiction.   
 
By the same token, John McCain has taken the fairly unusual step for him of 
publically endorsing President Obama’s position on an issue of national security, 
arguing for a greater role for the Department of Defense in drone operations.110  
Unstated is the fact that as chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee 
(SASC), such a shift in policy would have the effect of expanding the sphere of 
McCain’s power and influence.  As described in Chapter 2, the CIA has strongly 
resisted attempts by the two Armed Services Committees to exercise any 
meaningful oversight over the agency’s drone operations, going so far as to 
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refuse to testify at a 2014 SASC hearing when Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) chaired 
the panel.   
 
Of course, the CIA has far more to lose in this fight than any Senator or 
Congressman.  The agency has spent untold sums developing the capability to 
target and kill suspected terrorists anywhere across huge swaths of the globe.  
Accordingly, in a development that may be without precedent in American 
history, the CIA has armed itself for this purpose, acquiring a fleet of 
sophisticated unmanned aircraft to carry out this challenging mission.  And it’s a 
mission that the agency and its supporters, including Senator Feinstein, claim 
that it executes with unrivaled efficiency and precision.  In the absence of any 
reporting about the bureaucratic maneuvering that doubtless followed the 
President’s 2013 speech, it seems safe to assume that the CIA has strenuously 
objected to any and all efforts to strip away a drone program it obviously holds 
dear.   
 
It is also entirely possible that the transfer of authority to DOD has been thwarted 
not in spite of the President’s efforts but because he failed to follow through on 
the public commitment he made in 2013.  If President Obama were willing to 
expend the necessary political capital on this issue, it seems possible that the 




In theory at least, the President has the legal authority to overcome the forces of 
institutional inertia and inter-agency politics to reshape American drone programs 
to fit his vision.  Even the legal stumbling block that Senator Feinstein’s 
amendment presents hardly appears insurmountable.   
 
It’s illustrative to consider the boldness with which President Obama has pursued 
other objectives in his second term, even in the face of robust political opposition.  
For example, the President has already used his executive authority to achieve 
his aims in policy areas from immigration reform to the minimum wage to 
reestablishing relations with Cuba.  In light of Obama’s ambition, aggressiveness 
and apparently willingness to “go it alone” on these fronts, one is left with the 
distinct impression that the absence of meaningful progress in migrating drone 
operations to DOD results more from a lack of political will on the part of the 
President than from the stubbornness of any bureaucratic or structural barrier.         
 
The fiction of deniability 
As we have seen, the political environment since 2013 has not been conducive 
to transitioning exclusive responsibility for U.S. drone strikes to the Department 
of Defense.  However, there is a sense among some prominent observers that 
this major reform could be revived following the tragic deaths of Weinstein and 
Lo Porto in January.  But perhaps more important than asking if this change will 
happen, is the question of whether it’s actually a good idea.  Put another way, 
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would granting DOD a significantly greater role in the targeted killing of 
suspected terrorists be in the national security interest of the United States?            
 
As described in Chapter I, the overwhelming secrecy of American drone 
programs has undermined U.S. strategy in the war on terrorism.  First, the 
Administration’s decision to shroud the program in secrecy has allowed 
conspiracy theories to multiply across the Muslim world and “made it harder to 
refute claims of massive civilian deaths.”111  In addition, when the US has 
succeeded in killing notorious terrorist leaders guilty of murdering large numbers 
of Pakistanis, the Administration’s insistence on non-disclosure has prevented 
the United States from taking any of the credit.  Just as importantly, the 
Administration’s failure to communicate the basic facts of the program and 
explain the Administration’s decision-making process is directly contributing to 
the overwhelmingly negative perception of the United States in public opinion 
polls in most Muslim countries.112   
 
The needless secrecy of U.S. drone operations has compromised the 
effectiveness of America’s costly efforts to convince local populations to turn 
away from violent extremism.  The potential benefits of working to reduce civilian 
casualties are limited when the U.S. is prevented from telling the truth about the 
outcomes of its drone operations.  As Captain Joseph Chapa of the U.S. Air 
Force has argued, “…the federal government should not simply disclose but 
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publicize much of its RPA [remotely piloted aircraft] program that remains in the 
dark.  The battle for hearts and minds with respect to RPA’s is being waged in 
the PR domain.  Today, the enemy is winning.”113  Indeed, the war on terrorism is 
as much about the battle over ideas and information as it is about physical 
confrontations on the battlefield.  Yet, when it comes to the debate over drone 
strikes, the American government has essentially decided to unilaterally disarm.  
As Micah Zenko writes, “…because CIA strikes cannot be acknowledged, the 
United States has effectively ceded its strategic communications efforts to the 
Pakistani army and intelligence service, nongovernmental organizations, and the 
Taliban.”114   
 
The argument for all of this secrecy is based largely on the supposed need for 
deniability.  As described above, the covert nature of these CIA attacks (which 
the US never officially acknowledges, as a matter of both law and policy) is part 
of their appeal for government officials on all sides.  The CIA has long been 
reluctant—both for legal and operational reasons—to disclose almost anything 
about its drone strikes.  On the other hand, the Pakistani government has been 
allowed the political luxury of looking the other way and claiming to know nothing 
about actions they have tacitly sanctioned.  Supporters of the status quo warn 
that this convenient arrangement could evaporate if and when the Pentagon 
assumes control of the program.    
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However, these dangers have been greatly exaggerated.  While it is undoubtedly 
true that the deniability of CIA drone strikes has helped to smooth the 
contentious U.S. relationship with Pakistan, it’s not as if most of the Pakistani 
people—or, indeed, the western media—is in the dark about what is actually 
happening.  When hellfire missiles suddenly rain down on armed men in 
Waziristan, there isn’t really any doubt as to who fired them.  As described in 
Chapter I, Pakistani officials have readily provided data on US drone strikes to 
the United Nations.115  And interestingly, a U.S. federal court has already 
confirmed the ridiculousness of proceeding as if the mere fact that these 
operations are occurring is some kind of closely guarded secret.   
 
When the ACLU sued the CIA to force the disclosure of key documents related to 
its drone program, the agency flatly refused to comply on the grounds that to 
even admit to possessing these papers would be to acknowledge the existence 
of a covert program.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit 
unsurprisingly did not find this argument particularly compelling. As the court 
noted, the President himself had referred to the CIA drone program in public 
speeches.  Ultimately, in a damning opinion, the judges wrote that the CIA was 
asking the court to give its “imprimatur to a fiction of deniability that no 
reasonable person would regard as plausible.”116  Indeed, by now, the deniability 
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that CIA drone operations supposedly offer—the virtue that provides the rationale 
for all the secrecy that encompasses the agency’s program—is exactly that, a 
fiction.  And it is one that the U.S. government would be wise to dispense with in 
order to further the pursuit of its strategic objectives in the fight against Islamic 
extremism.   
 
The complex, conflicting case for DOD drone control 
As explained in Chapter I, misinformation about the destruction inflicted by 
American drone strikes has understandably sparked outrage across the Muslim 
world.  One partial solution to this problem is to insist on greater openness and 
transparency.  As Congressman Schiff editorialized in 2014, “…greater 
disclosure would be in our interest.  In the absence of official accounts, inflated 
and often wildly inaccurate assertions of the number of civilian casualties — 
generally advanced by our enemies — fill the informational vacuum.”117  For this 
reason, if the U.S. government is to avoid creating more new terrorists than it 
kills, increasing the transparency of American drone programs is critical.   
 
While the Pentagon should certainly do more to explain when and how DOD 
targeting policies are implemented, the U.S. military’s drone program is, by 
design, far more open to public scrutiny than the parallel effort operated by the 
CIA.  But contrary to the public case put forward by those who favor moving all 
drone operations to DOD, it is not necessarily the case that the military would 
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maintain the same level of transparency were it to begin flying operations over 
Pakistan over other countries where deniability is considered politically valuable.   
 
Similarly, Chapter II detailed the ongoing failure of the two Select Committees on 
Intelligence in Congress to exercise robust oversight over CIA drone operations.  
But again, contrary to the claims of those who strongly support transferring this 
responsibility to DOD, it is unclear that full military control over drone strikes 
would necessarily lead to greater congressional scrutiny of these operations.  In 
fact, JSOC has arguably received even less concerned attention from the 
legislative branch than the CIA. 
 
Micah Zenko writes that “…the U.S. government cannot legally acknowledge 
covert actions undertaken by the CIA” and therefore lead authority for targeted 
killings should be transferred to DOD.118  But is legal basis on which this 
argument rest accurate?  The reality, as Georgetown Law Professor Marty 
Lederman and others have argued, is more complicated than Zenko’s statement 
might lead one to believe.   
 
Covert actions are defined in law as “activity or activities of the United States 
Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where 
it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent 
or acknowledged publicly.”119  The statute goes on to spell out precisely what 
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must occur if some an operation is to be undertaken.  First, these actions must 
be authorized in writing by the President. (This is known as a “written presidential 
finding.”) And second, Congress must be apprised of the activity.120  These 
sensible, straightforward requirements are intended to ensure that the Executive 
Branch is held accountable for operations that may be extraordinarily sensitive 
and could have far-reaching consequences.  
 
However—and here are two critical points often lost in the media coverage of this 
issue—the law only prescribes what steps must be taken if an operation is to be 
conducted covertly; it does restrict what kinds of operations may be publically 
acknowledged and, conversely, what operations must remain secret.  Moreover, 
the statute makes no mention of which agencies these constraints will apply to.  
Consequently, Lederman writes, “…as far as the law is concerned, both the CIA 
and DOD can engage in activities that are not officially acknowledged; and 
likewise, both can engage in overseas activities that are officially acknowledged, 
as long as they have an independent source of affirmative authority for doing so,” 
such as the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force against Al Qaeda and its 
affiliates.121 
 
According to this logic, the claim that, by law, none of the details pertaining to a 
CIA drone strike can ever be publically disclosed is false.  A political decision 
was made to make these operations “covert” and the agency has subsequently 








followed the legal restrictions that follow from this determination.  By the same 
token, the law does not require that military strikes must necessarily be 
considered “non-covert.”  In fact, DOD has opted against acknowledging its role 
in strikes in Yemen—a country where both the CIA and the U.S. military operate 
drones—under the logic that to refuse to accept responsibility for a particular 
drone attack would be to, ipso facto, assign credit to the CIA.     
 
This legal analysis has important policy implications.  In his New York Times Op-
ed, Congressman Schiff wrote that moving all targeted killing programs to DOD 
would “…enable us to be more public about the successes and failures of the 
drone program, since such operations would no longer be covert.”122 [Emphasis 
mine] Yet, as we have seen, Schiff’s conclusion may not be valid.  As Hannah 
Gais of the Foreign Policy Association has rightly pointed out, if the transition to 
DOD control were to happen, we can confidently say that “drone strikes could no 
longer be covert, but that doesn’t necessarily mean they wouldn’t be covert.”123   
 
Indeed, under a scenario in which President Obama’s vision has been realized 
and JSOC has assumed control of all drone strikes, one could easily envision 
that many or even all strikes in Pakistan and perhaps elsewhere would continue 
to go unacknowledged and would inevitably be wrapped in the same secrecy that 
currently subsumes CIA drone operations.  Without additional reforms, moving 
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full responsibility for drone warfare to the Pentagon will simply not be enough to 
guarantee any significant improvement in the transparency of these operations.   
 
Similarly, shifting all targeted killings to military control will not, by itself, lead to 
more consequential congressional oversight of activities that have long cried out 
for greater attention from the legislative branch. The CIA currently informs the 
House and Senate Select Committees on Intelligence of all drone strikes and 
Senate committee staff reportedly view video of the attacks as well.  This is 
consistent with longstanding congressional notification procedures that date to 
Operation Eagle Claw – the disastrous 1979 attempt to rescue hostages taken 
from the America embassy in Tehran.   
 
Because of the need for extreme secrecy, President Carter decided that the 
intelligence committees would not be briefed by CIA Director Stansfield Turner 
until after the operation was completed.  The congressional leadership was 
understandably displeased and in 1980, as part of a broader package of 
intelligence reforms, Congress established in statute the “Gang of Eight” 
notification procedure.124  From this point on, while the Executive was explicitly 
required to brief Congress on sensitive covert actions, the President could limit 
notification to the House and Senate leadership as well as the chairs and ranking 
members of the two intelligence committee if, in his or her judgment, limiting 
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notification to this select group was “essential to meet extraordinary 
circumstances affecting vital U.S. interests.”125   
 
More recently, in 2009, Democrats responded to the public outcry over CIA 
abuses in the period after the 9-11 attacks by once again strengthening the 
protocols governing the Gang of Eight.  The Fiscal Year 2010 Intelligence 
Authorization Act required, for the first time, a written notification to the 
intelligence committees from the President explaining his or her rationale for 
resorting to the Gang of Eight procedure.  The committees were also required to 
be informed of significant changes to any pre-approved action and all members 
of the intelligence panels—not just the members of the Gang—would now need 
to be briefed within 180 days after any covert operation was completed.126 
 
According to the two Intelligence panels, the CIA has largely abided by these 
requirements.  As result, earlier this year, Senator Feinstein insisted that “…we 
have much more oversight over the intelligence [drone] program than over the 
military program, and that’s just a fact.”127  Moreover, in the event that the 
Pentagon were to assume full control over these operations, it is also unclear 
how much of an appetite the House and Senate Armed Services Committee 
would have to take a more considered look at an expanded DOD drone program.   
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To date, the interest shown by the two committees in military drone operations 
has, at least from the outside, appeared relatively inconsequential. In addition, 
doubts have been raised about JSOC’s willingness to share information about 
targeted killing operations with the Command’s congressional overseers.  Writing 
in Foreign Policy, Chris Woods quotes one high-ranking official who told him that 
he did not think “…JSOC doing it is going to be more transparent than the current 
situation.  Because JSOC doesn’t talk much to the Armed Services guys, 
compared to what some other committees get.”128129 
 
It is also presently unclear whether—if DOD were to begin flying covert drone 
strikes—the Department would be subject to the same notification requirements 
that currently bind the CIA.  The letter of the law would seem to strongly suggest 
that the military would, in fact, need to provide the same kinds of notifications to 
Congress that the intelligence community currently provides because, again, the 
relevant statute does not make distinctions between agencies.   
 
However, it is not publically known to what extent DOD presently briefs Congress 
on the relatively small number of covert operations it already conducts.  As 
Jennifer Kibbe wrote back in 2004 as the intensity of U.S. drone warfare was 
beginning to mount, “Although the CIA has apparently met these [notification] 
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requirements, there is considerable confusion over whether the military has or 
should.”130  Kibbe notes that the U.S. Code does provide an exception for 
“traditional military activities”131 but it would certainly appear to be a stretch to 
argue that strikes from unmanned aircraft on non-combatant countries fit that 
definition.  And in the absence of a strong legal precedent, it seems likely that the 
military would opt against rigorous disclosures to the legislative branch.     
 
Regardless of how the law should best be interpreted, confusion clearly exists 
over an important aspect of congressional oversight of DOD drone operations.  
And this very uncertainty reinforces the case for instituting strong reforms that 
would clarify DOD’s legal obligations if and when full responsibility for drone 
strikes is transferred to the military.            
 
The virtues of consolidation 
As we have seen, vexing questions about congressional oversight complicate the 
case for military control of drone warfare.  However, it’s worth noting that one 
factor which has undermined the legislative branch’s ability to oversee and 
improve U.S. drone operations is precisely the division of responsibility between 
two completely different organizations in the CIA and DOD that exclusively 
answer to two completely different House and Senate committees—the 
Intelligence and Armed Services panels, respectively.  A case can be made that 
the simple fact of having a single program, operated by a single entity and 
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responsible to a single set of congressional committees will enhance Congress’ 
power relative to the executive branch.   
 
This speaks to one of the strongest arguments for sole military control of drone 
warfare.  The current division of responsibility, with its parallel programs and 
duplicative systems and personnel, is unnecessarily redundant.  Both the CIA 
and the Pentagon maintain, at great cost to the American taxpayer, two separate 
fleets of armed drones with identical capabilities.  Yet, despite being designed to 
accomplish the same mission, the relevant systems employed by the CIA and the 
U.S. military are incompatible.132   
 
Perhaps more importantly, the status quo also creates bureaucratic barriers to 
providing much-needed clarity about U.S. drone programs, both to the American 
people as well as to affected populations overseas.  As Zenko has written, “U.S. 
targeted killings are needlessly made complex and opaque by their division 
between two separate entities…Although drone strikes carried out by the two 
organizations presumably target the same people, the organizations have 
different authorities, policies, accountability mechanisms, and oversight.”133  And 
if we appreciate the benefits of this consolidation, we should also recognize that 
it would be far better to streamline these operations under the auspices of an 
organization which is already operating in a relatively transparent manner—the 




 Gordon Lubold and Shane Harris, “The CIA , Not the Pentagon, Will Keep Running Obama’s Drone 
War,” Foreign Policy, November 6, 2013 
133
 Zenko, Ibid 
89 
 
Department of Defense—instead of bringing drone programs together at agency 
that is legally, culturally and institutionally committed to secrecy.   
 
In time, consolidating armed drone operations at DOD may even prove 
advantageous for the CIA.  It is the nature of bureaucracies to resist giving up 
control over any of the functions they perform.  And the CIA’s leadership has no 
doubt strenuously opposed relinquishing the targeted killing mission and the tens 
of millions of dollars in funding that come with it.  However, if this critical reform 
does eventually move forward, it may actually benefit the CIA in the long-term by 
forcing the agency to refocus on its core competencies.   
 
Operating a fleet of unmanned aerial vehicles and conducting strikes on targets 
overseas is far removed from the agency’s foundational mission of gather 
overseas intelligence.  Giving up drone operations would compel the agency to 
once again concentrate its limited resources on this critical task instead of 
dividing itself institutionally between the fundamentally different responsibilities of 
collecting and assessing information, on the one hand; and the quasi-military act 
of identifying and eliminating suspected terrorists, on the other.       
 
Conclusion: Setting a positive precedent 
Given the various political and bureaucratic obstacles described above, it is 
unclear whether the renewed momentum behind moving all drone operations to 
the Pentagon will lead to any tangible progress.  One possibility is that a 
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mutually-agreeable middle path will be sought by the Obama administration, 
allowing the CIA to remain intimately involved in the targeted killing of terror 
suspects.  Under one such plan, the agency would still select and monitor priority 
individuals but would leave the act of actually eliminating them to the Defense 
Department.  In the CIA’s parlance, it would retain responsibility for the first two 
steps of a process which has become known as “find, fix and finish.” 134  In 
essence, DOD would simply assume all responsibility for pulling the trigger.           
 
This apparent “solution” is mere window-dressing and will do little to address the 
significant legal and transparency concerns that motivated President Obama to 
propose the transfer of responsibility away from the CIA in the first place.  This 
arrangement could also create new coordination challenges that could lead to 
bungled operations and unnecessary civilian deaths as the agency and the 
Pentagon, with their conflicting cultures and priorities, are forced to work together 
in new ways and under trying circumstances.   
 
Moreover, a compromise along these lines would foreclose the possibility of 
realizing perhaps the most significant benefit of realigning drone operations 
under the Pentagon’s control – the potential for this single momentous change to 
act as a catalyst for a broader set of reforms.  As detailed in this chapter, 
improvements in transparency, accountability and oversight will not be 
guaranteed simply because drone programs have been transferred to the 
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Department of Defense.  Ensuring that drone strikes are conducted in a more 
cautious, selective and open manner will require other reforms, including 
mandating full disclosure of the policies governing these attacks and ordering a 
complete public accounting of when and where they occur.  The act of 
consolidating control of U.S. drone warfare at the Pentagon has the potential to 
ignite public debate, engage congressional leaders and provide the impetus for 
implementing these transformational improvements.     
 
Again, to be clear, shifting control of drone warfare to the Pentagon is not a clear 
remedy for all of the problems discussed in Chapter I.  It would not necessarily 
reduce the potential for “blowback” among civilian populations affected by 
American drone strikes. Nor—given the US military’s record of obfuscation over 
the past decade—would it obviously produce the increased transparency and 
accountability that critics have long demanded.  Indeed, this reform should not be 
regarded as a “solution.”  Instead, based on the available evidence, DOD control 
of drone operations would seem to represent a sensible improvement over a 
deeply-flawed status quo.  As described above, the military’s drone policies, with 
their clearly defined internal checks and balances, appear to be more exacting 
than the CIA’s, while the mere act of consolidation would reduce redundancy and 
improve congressional oversight.           
 
Ultimately, this debate is important for reasons beyond the effectiveness of U.S. 
drone strikes.  The choice to enlist the CIA in the targeting killing mission 
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arguably set a troubling precedent.  Fundamentally, intelligence agencies should 
not be in the business of fighting America’s wars overseas.  As Senator McCain 
has colorfully argued, “Since when is the [CIA] supposed to be an Air Force of 
drones that goes around killing people?”135   
 
Given the United States’ global standing, the way America exercises its power is 
sometimes just as important as the results that its power achieves.  Especially 
when it comes to drone operations—a new dimension of human warfare—and at 
a time when as many as 76 different countries are pursuing drone technology,136 
the United States has the opportunity to establish a rulebook that, in time, others 
will be obligated to follow.  As Daniel Byman has written, “The coming 
proliferation means that Washington needs to set a clear policy now on 
extrajudicial and extraterritorial killings of terrorists—and stick to it.”137     
 
In light of this profound responsibility, there are moral as well as strategic 
reasons to believe that America would be well-served by adopting a new course.  
Specifically, the Obama administration should embrace the chance to set a 
global precedent that armed drones should be operated not by shadowy, 
clandestine agencies but by uniformed military forces acting in accordance with 
the laws of war.              
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The United States isn’t the only nation that conducts drone strikes.  Britain 
operates some of the same sophisticated UAV’s and uses them to target 
suspected terrorists from the skies above Iraq and Afghanistan.  But though the 
systems they employ and the men in their cross-hairs fit almost identical profiles, 
British and American drone operators are guided by different sets of policies.138   
 
A detailed comparison of the two national approaches to drone warfare might 
prove illuminating, but the secrecy of the US drone program would probably 
make such an analysis infeasible, at least for outside observers.  However, what 
we can say with some certainty is that the political decision to be far more 
transparent about the particulars of its drone operations doesn’t appear to have 
significantly undermined British national security or the effectiveness of its drone 
program.   
 
As the Australian defense analyst Rosalyn Turner has written, “The UK has 
made an effort to embrace transparency around its use of [drones] in military 
operations, most likely to allay speculation that it conducts covert strikes that 
have proven unpopular for the US…The UK’s use of drone strikes may not have 
garnered as much attention as the widespread actions of the US. Yet in many 
ways the UK’s more limited use of armed drones has shown how successful this 
approach can be.”139   
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Admittedly, British UAV’s do not engage in politically problematic strikes on 
Pakistani or Yemeni soil.  Still, their activities are documented, the statistics are 
made publically available, and the government regularly answers questions 
about their use—important steps the US government has been loath to consider.   
 
Contrary to the view that prevails at the CIA and the Pentagon, the British 
experience would seem to suggest that greater openness might not be such a 
fraught proposition after all.  Indeed, throughout the preceding chapters, I have 
argued that enhanced transparency would benefit the United States not just 
through the sanitizing effects that sunlight frequently has on shadowy 
government programs.  In addition, and perhaps more importantly, greater 
openness would address perhaps the gravest failing of the American targeted 
killing program—the fact that it continues to profoundly alienate people across 
the Muslim world, feeding into the very notions of unmitigated, out-of-control 
American power that the Obama administration has been so keen to mitigate and 
that America’s adversaries have been so eager to promote. 
 
As explained in Chapter I, this points to an over-arching challenge that President 
Obama and his successor must address.  On the one hand, the United States 
needs a drone program that is both effective and expansive enough in its scope 
to extinguish extremist threats from Africa to the Middle East to Central Asia.  On 
the other, that program must be precise enough and cautious enough to avoid 
radicalizing civilian populations that live, in many cases, directly alongside the 
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targets of American aggression.  It’s a tricky task and one that high ranking 
officials in the Obama Administration have extensively pondered, especially in 
the wake of American drone strikes that missed the mark with gruesome 
consequences.   
 
Threading this needle is made even more difficult by the fact that the right 
policy—assuming one can be identified—cannot always be implemented through 
fiat alone, as President Obama himself discovered when he called for the 
transfer of drone operations to DOD control.  As with nearly everything in 
Washington, bureaucratic and congressional politics must also be negotiated.  
And indeed, Congress’ striking indifference to the failings of American drone 
warfare speaks to the urgent need for reforms not just to clandestine programs 
like this one, but also to the manner in which these programs are overseen by 
the legislative branch.   
 
What, then, should be done?  First, the US government should consider 
conducting—and eventually making public in some form—precisely the kind of 
broad, independent analysis of the strategic costs and benefits of the US 
approach to drone warfare that this paper has attempted to furnish.  Of course, 
such a review would benefit from access to classified data—a resource that 




In addition, the findings in the preceding chapters point to several straight-
forward reforms, some of which have already been discussed in detail.  The 
horrendous deaths of the Yemeni wedding party described in Chapter I and the 
accidental killing of two Western hostages as explained in Chapter III would 
seem to lead to a very obvious recommendation – that American drone operators 
should know whom they are aiming at, with at least a fair degree of certainty, 
before pulling the trigger.  Of course, intelligence will never be perfect and even 
the best surveillance can lead to the wrong conclusions.  Still, the sheer number 
of civilians killed and the frequency with which the media and NGO’s have 
reported on strikes gone wrong, would seem to indicate that this kind of 
discretion is not an institutional priority for either the CIA or the Department of 
Defense. 
 
Incredibly, the strike that killed American aid worker Warren Weinstein was not 
the first time a drone had fired on a compound where extremists were holding a 
US citizen captive.  Several years earlier, journalist David Rohde was captured 
by Taliban insurgents and removed to the same remote corner of Pakistan.  
While there, an American missile exploded just outside the building where he 
was held, killed several low-level associates of his captors.  Just like Weinstein 
incident, the CIA had no knowledge that Rohde was being held in the vicinity.  
Thankfully, helped by a captive Afghan, Rohde managed to escape and has now 
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understandably become a critic of the American drone program that could so 
easily have killed him.140   
 
One reform endorsed by Rohde has already been implemented, but only on a 
limited basis.  So called “signature strikes” are drone attacks based not on 
specific intelligence about a particular individual (these are known as “personality 
strikes”) but instead, killing missions launched when men viewed thousands of 
feet from the ground are behaving in a manner that suggests they are probably 
extremists or insurgents.  This targeting method has proven extremely 
controversial and new restrictions were put in place in 2013 by the Obama 
administration in response to criticism that “signature strikes” were responsible 
for unacceptable numbers of civilian casualties.   
 
However, according to reports in the news media, CIA drone operations over 
Pakistan were exempted from these rules.141  While anonymous sources at the 
intelligence agency continue to vouch for their effectiveness, the lack of 
discretion inherent in the signature strikes that caused the death of Warren 
Weinstein, almost killed David Rohde and continues to produce high numbers of 
civilian casualties leads inextricably to the conclusion that they should be 
prohibited.  A similar argument can be made for banning strikes against low-level 
fighters outside of the traditional battlefield.  These men are readily replaceable 
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and their deaths contribute little to the advancement of America’s strategic 
objectives.   
 
The military drone program does not, at least officially, engage in signature 
strikes.  As explained in detail in Chapter III, this is just one of many reasons why 
President Obama’s proposal to grant full control of drone warfare to the military 
makes practical sense. Yet this reform—however impactful it might appear—is 
far from a panacea.  Unless Congress and the Administration act, there is a 
significant risk that the newly embolden DOD drone program could end up being 
just as bad, if not worse, than the CIA program it subsumed.   
 
Specifically, while the CIA conducts covert strikes and the military currently does 
not, the intelligence agency is at least legally bound by strict congressional 
notification requirements.  As described in Chapter III, one can easily imagine a 
scenario in which the military begins executing its own covert strikes but 
considers itself exempt from the obligation to keep Congress rigorous informed of 
these activities.  That’s why Congress should assert its constitutional prerogative 
and clarify first and foremost that, except under rare circumstances, drone strikes 
should be conducted overtly.  And second, that all covert operations—regardless 
of which agency or department leads them—are equally bound by requirement to 




Of course, as we’ve seen, meaningful congressional action on this front appears 
unlikely.  Part of the genius of the American system of government is the 
recognition that intense deliberation and debate often yields better policy than 
unthinking acquiescence.  Unfortunately, Congress’ attitude towards the 
American targeted killing program has been marked by undue deference and 
almost embarrassing indifference.  This troubling state of affairs could be rectified 
in part by enabling more members of Congress to meaningfully participate in the 
policy-making process.  While this raises the potential for more unauthorized 
leaks of sensitive information, that risk is substantially outweighed by the critical 
need for more robust, independent and objective oversight of clandestine 
programs, including drone strikes.       
 
Drones are now an indispensable instrument of American foreign policy and yet 
the House and Senate Foreign Affairs Committees have been prevented for 
conducting meaningful oversight of US drone programs.  Similarly, as described 
in Chapter II, efforts by the Senate Armed Services Committee to gain a 
complete picture of American drone operations by including the CIA in hearings 
on the subject have been stymied by the agency and the White House.  These 
mindless turf battles have done nothing to enhance Congress’ power vis-à-vis 
the executive and have prevented reform-minded members of the legislative 
branch from contributing to the debate.  This is an unfortunate dynamic and one 
that Congress and the Obama Administration should seek to transform as part of 




It’s important to note the limitations of these reforms.  Even if they were fully 
implemented (an unlikely prospect), it is far from clear that a more strategically 
effective American done program would necessarily turn the tide of the global 
war on terror or even make a telling difference in any specific theater.  Despite 
launching hundreds of strikes over the past decades, the United States has failed 
to halt the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) or to deal a 
definitive blow to the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan.  This is a reflection less 
of the shortcomings of the US drone program (although, as we’ve seen, they are 
significant) and more of the inescapable reality that American military force alone 
is incapable of addressing the deep-seated political and religious rifts that gave 
rise to the conflicts in these countries.  As I stated at the close of Chapter I, drone 
strikes may be among the most potent and prominent instruments of American 
power in the struggle against Islamic extremism but, ultimately, they are only a 
tool.  Absent a cohesive, overarching strategy for prevailing in the war on terror 
that effectively incorporates all of the levers of American policy—including 
drones—the reforms discussed above may have a limited impact. 
 
It’s also worth noting some of the critical questions that lie beyond the scope of 
this analysis.  While I focused here on relatively straight-forward concerns 
regarding the strategic effectiveness of American drone strikes and the merits of 
certain proposed reforms, academics and policy-makers should also attend to 




Specifically, as I mentioned previously, significant legal questions remain about 
the legality of targeted killings under both domestic and international law, 
especially where US citizens are concerned.  Critics have also raised the 
possibility that the absence of any real risk to US personnel may—intentionally or 
not—make commanders more cavalier about their use, potentially entangling the 
United States in more conflicts over time.  As the authors of the Stimson Task 
Force write, “The increasing use of lethal UAVs may create a slippery slope 
leading to continual or wider wars. The seemingly low-risk and low-cost missions 
enabled b UAV technologies may encourage the United States to fly such 
missions more often, pursuing targets with UAVs that would be deemed not 
worth pursuing if manned aircraft or special operation forces had to be put at 
risk.”142   
 
Finally, important questions have been raised about the psychological effects of 
drone warfare—both on decision-makers and operators; whether its very 
remoteness disguises the inherent cruelty and human suffering of war.  Some 
have even argued that this technology has transformed the act of killing into 
something akin to playing a video game.143  In these and in countless other ways, 
large and small, drones may over time come to reshape the “American way of 
war”—a topic which undoubtedly merits additional scholarly inquiry.                     
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In closing, I will note that there is a certain irony in the fact that a President 
seeking to repair the fractured relationship between the United States and the 
Muslim world has nevertheless presided over the dramatic expansion of a 
program of deadly drone strikes which has proven exceptionally unpopular in 
these countries.144  Of course, President Obama would probably argue that any 
other means of eliminating suspected terrorists, including the deployment of 
ground troops, would doubtless have had a far more pronounced impact on 
public opinion in these countries.   
 
Still, a strong argument can be made that the way in which drone operations 
under his administration have been conducted is, in key respects, at odds with 
his own conception of how the struggle against Islamic extremism can be won—
not by applying maximal force but by employing American power in smarter, 
more effective ways.  This is a President who recognizes the contest of ideas 
that lies at the heart of the fight against Islamic terrorism and yet has failed to 
ensure that drone strikes are helping—and not hurting—the American cause in 
this struggle.   
 
Over his remaining year and a half in office, President Obama would be wise to 
seek to implement a drone policy which is more consistent with America’s 
strategic interests and with his own broad vision for American foreign policy.   
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